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I. THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: A REGION AFFECTED BY THE 
NEW WORLD ORDER? 
The South Caucasus, also referred to as the Transcaucasus,1 has long served as an 
arena for the competing interests of the dominant regional powers: Russia, Turkey and 
Iran. The region has great geo-strategic significance; its location between Central Asia 
and Europe, Southern Russia and the Middle East, and its role as a gateway to large oil 
and gas deposits of the Caspian basin, have made it one of the most “coveted pieces of 
territory in the World.”2 The breakup of the Soviet Union and re-emergence of the three 
South Caucasian states—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia—have changed the 
geopolitics of the region immensely. These states’ old fears of superpower domination 
have become refocused on the threats of regional powers, which enjoy greater freedom of 
action after Moscow’s abrupt departure. 
A new struggle seems to be under way as regional states and outside powers 
jockey for economic influence and compete to fill the political vacuum created with the 
Soviet collapse. Some analysts and media reporters see in this maneuvering a ghost of the 
nineteenth century “Great Game.”3 Importantly, the form and quality, complexity and 
dynamism of the new Great Game make it distinctly different from the nineteenth century 
power competition.  
The most powerful of the players in the new Game is the last global 
superpower—the United States. Its regional policies during the last decade have evolved 
from deference to Russia’s regional dominance and cautious activism toward increasing 
                                                 
1 The term Transcaucasus is the literal translation of Russian word “Zakavkaz’ie,” which means the 
area beyond the Caucasus Mountain Range. This term, therefore, reflects Russo-centric perspective of the 
region. This thesis uses the terms “South Caucasus” and “Transcaucasus” interchangeably. 
2 Mustafa Aydin, “Regional Security Issues and Conflicts in the Caucasus and the Caspian Regions,” 
in International Security Challenges in a Changing World, ed. Kurt R. Spillmann and Joachim Krause 
(Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1999), 118. 
3 The term “Great Game” was originally coined by Rudyard Kipling when referring to the 
confrontation between the Russian and British empires in Central Asia. See Gareth M. Winrow, “A New 
Great Game in the Transcaucasus?” in The Euro-Asian World: A Period of Transition, ed. Yelena 
Kalyuzhnova and Dov Lynch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 45-46; “Armenia/Georgia: Great 
Game Upsets Bilateral Ties.” Oxford Analytica, 07 February 2002, 2. Online. Available from Proquest 
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed 30 January 2006); Robert Kaplan, “The Great Game Isn’t Over,” The 
Wall Street Journal, (24 November 1999), A18. Online. Available from Proquest 
http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed 30 January 2006). 
2 
strategic engagement. Other rival powers pursuing a stake in the South Caucasus are 
Turkey, Iran, and Russia. One of the primary players in the Great Game, Russia, almost 
by default has been the major political-military player in the Transcaucasus.4 It has 
employed various tactics at its disposal to maintain and expand its influence on the 
region. 
The differing interests of regional players have tended to increase the polarization 
of the region’s politics, thus making the Southern Caucasian states’ path to stability more 
difficult. Importantly, external influences on the Southern Caucasian states have been 
compounded by their internal vulnerabilities. All three countries are torn by unresolved 
ethnic conflicts that significantly hamper regional stability and development. The 
Southern Caucasian states share some common internal problems and external influences 
(Russia’s reassertion of its economic and military power, a Turkish drive for geopolitical 
influence, increasing U.S. engagement in the region).  However, each has developed a 
different strategy, and they pursue divergent foreign policy paths based on their threat 
perceptions and calculations of their national interests. The resulting alignments are 
contradictory and have the potential to upset regional security. Armenia has close 
security relations with Russia, Azerbaijan has aligned with Turkey, while Georgia mainly 
seeks American protection.  
Which country Armenia should align with has long been a subject of controversy 
within Armenian politics and among analysts.5 The wave of velvet revolutions that swept 
through the former Soviet territory in 2003-2004 has once again intensified that debate. 
In a neighborhood where so many powerful regional players jockey for influence, betting 
on the wrong side might have potentially disastrous consequences for the state and  
 
                                                 
4 David E. Mark, “Eurasia Letter: Russia and the New Transcaucasus,” Foreign Policy, No. 105 
(Winter 1996-1997), 142. 
5 See for example Naira Mamikonyan, “Inchn eh Khochndotum Kayunutyanah” (What Hampers 
Stability?) Aravot. August 5, 2005. Available from http://www.aravot.am/ (accessed 10 September 2005); 
Onnik Krikorian, “Revolution in Georgia: What Next for Armenia?” HetqOnline, Investigative Journalists 
of Armenia, 24 May 2004. Online. Available from http://www.hetq.am/eng/politics/ (accessed 10 
September 2005); “Armenia/Russia: Yerevan Plays Moscow Against West,” Oxford Analytica, 02 June 
2004, 2. Online. Available from Proquest http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed 30 January 2006); 
“Armenian Politics: Moving Closer to Russia,” The Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, New York, 11 
July 2003. Online. Available from Proquest http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed 10 September 2005). 
3 
significant implications for regional stability and development. It is therefore important to 
understand Armenia’s policies, security concerns, and interdependencies in the larger 
regional context, and this study focuses on these issues. 
The purpose of this work is primarily to evaluate Armenian foreign policy toward 
the two major regional players—the United States and Russia. What are the United 
States’ and Russia’s security, economic, political and human rights interests in the South 
Caucasus? What are the regional security interdependencies and how are they influenced 
by these powers? What are the major determinants of Armenia’s foreign policy? In its 
pursuit of national interests, what should be Armenia’s foreign policy toward these 
powers? Answering these questions requires knowing Armenia’s geopolitical 
environment, security concerns and historical experience. 
This thesis finds that Armenia, despite its limited natural resource base and 
geopolitical complexities, has managed its foreign relations and has addressed its national 
security concerns quite well. It has maintained good relations with both Russia and the 
United States, helping to reduce regional polarization and its own security dependence on 
either of the powers. The flexibility of its policy has allowed Armenia to adjust easily to 
global geopolitical and regional trends. Increasing U.S. involvement in the South 
Caucasus and the U.S.-Russian strategic partnership have opened up new avenues for 
Armenia to strengthen its security. To support these conclusions, this investigation is 
organized into four major sections. 
A. CHAPTER II 
Chapter II lays out the methodology and theoretical framework based on the 
neorealist and neoliberal models of analysis. To explain and predict Armenia’s foreign 
policy behavior, it discusses balance of power and balance of threat theories, and the 
sensitivity and vulnerability dimensions of neoliberal interdependence theory. This 
chapter also examines the value of focusing on the South Caucasus as a regional security 
system or complex, which is important in highlighting security interdependencies within 
the South Caucasian regional security subsystem and analyzing their influence on 
Armenia’s alignment choices. 
 
4 
B. CHAPTER III 
Chapter III examines the evolution of Russia’s foreign policy towards the South 
Caucasus in order to identify Russia’s long-term interests in the region. For Russia, 
military-strategic and economic interests are the highest priority. Russia views the 
Transcaucasian countries and the North Caucasus as part of the same security complex 
and accordingly has four major interests:  1) preventing foreign penetration into the 
region, 2) strengthening collective security frameworks and maintaining its military 
presence in the South Caucasus, 3) fighting threats of terrorism and radical Islam with the 
potential to spread and destabilize the entire Caucasus, 4) expanding economically and 
achieving control over key energy sectors to insure potential leverage over political 
developments of regional states.  This chapter focuses also on the opportunities and 
threats created by Russia’s policies for the security of Transcaucasian countries.   
C. CHAPTER IV 
The fourth chapter examines the evolution of U.S. foreign policy towards the 
South Caucasus in order to highlight the regional geopolitical trends and identify key 
U.S. interests in the region. For the United States, security, human rights and economic 
interests are the highest priority. The United States is interested in 1) enhancing regional 
security and stability within the prism of a global fight against terrorism, 2) lessening the 
dependence of regional states on Russia, 3) promoting development of East-West energy 
transport corridors, and 4) supporting democratic transition and growth of market 
economies.  This chapter also discusses the implications of U.S. policies for the security 
of South Caucasian states, and examines the impact of U.S.-Russian relations on the 
regional security environment. 
D. CHAPTER V 
Chapter V explores Armenia’s geopolitical realties and assesses the impact of its 
external security environment on the country’s alignment choices. To highlight the 
regional security interdependencies that critically shape Armenia’s strategic outlook, 
special consideration is given to Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations 
and to the Nagorno-Karabakh conundrum. This chapter then discusses Armenia’s foreign 
policy of “multidirectional complementarity” and provides a theoretical explanation for 
it, based on the major findings from analysis of Russian and U.S. regional policies. 
5 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
What are the linkages between systemic factors and Armenia’s strategic 
environment? What are the security interdependencies among regional states and how do 
these interdependencies influence Armenia’s behavior towards Russia and the United 
States? How have American and Russian interests in the region changed, and what 
opportunities and threats do they pose? How can Armenia extract greater benefits from 
regional players and what national strategies best serve its interests? In order to address 
these questions, it is necessary to understand the theoretical approaches to the behavior of 
a peculiar set of international actors—the small states.  
The behavior of nation-states is affected by a number of factors that are 
commonly organized into three levels of analysis: the individual, the state, and the 
international system.6 The first and second level theories focus on individual decision-
makers and domestic political processes, respectively, while the third level systemic 
theories focus on the structure of the international system. Each of those approaches is a 
composite of a number of models, which arguably complement each other and enhance 
strategists’ ability to explain and predict the behavior of small states. Although the 
dynamics at the unit level and the perceptions of individual leaders are quite important 
for the analysis of small state behavior, this study focuses on systemic theoretical models, 
and, particularly, on neorealist and neoliberal approaches. Neorealists and neoliberals 
offer different operational assumptions for the behavior of small states, and these 
differences might have important policy consequences for Armenia. 
B. NEOREALISM 
The neorealist tradition describes the international system as an anarchic, 
decentralized environment in which the most typical activity is a state of war interrupted 
by periods of recuperation and preparation for the next war.7 The states as unitary, 
rational actors are primarily concerned with their own security and survival in the 
                                                 
6 Robert Jervis, “Perceptions and the Level of Analysis Problem,” in Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 15-28.  
7 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 88. 
6 
existing self-help international system. The system shapes the nature of the interactions 
between states, inducing them to subordinate economic gains to security interests so that 
they avoid situations of increased dependence and cooperative endeavors that might 
provide disproportionate gains to others.8  Using this logic, economic interdependence is 
undesirable, because the more the economic destinies of states are interlinked, the less are 
they individually able to dominate the outcomes.9 This is even more pronounced for 
small and weak states, whose dependent engagements come at an extremely high cost.10 
Within the system, states are differently situated based on their power, which is 
estimated by the distribution of capabilities among them.11 Small states have fewer 
capabilities than major states; the major states shape “the structure of international 
politics.”12 This implies that weak and small states must choose appropriate strategies for 
their survival within the boundaries “set by inter-great-power relations.”13 Balancing and 
bandwagoning are the two major strategies that small states use to preserve themselves 
and to neutralize threats to their security.14  
The critical question here is whether states generally respond to a rising power by 
balancing against it or bandwagoning with it. The answer to that question is important for 
defining national interests and for formulating a small state’s national strategy. Moreover, 
misperceiving the dominant tendency of balancing and bandwagoning is risky, because 
the two strategies imply very different policy prescriptions; a strategy appropriate for one 
situation will fail completely in another.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 105. 
9 This type of thinking has come to be known as “an economic agenda for neo-realists” or geo-
economics. See Michael Sheehan, International Security: An Analytical Survey (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2005), 72-73. 
10 Ibid., 106. 
11 Ibid., 95-96. 
12 Ibid., 94. 
13 Annete Baker Fox. Quoted in Raimo Vayrynen, “Small States: Persisting Despite Doubts,” in The 
National Security of Small States in a Changing World, ed. Efraim Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer (London: 
Frank Cass, 1997), 43.  
14 Vayrynen, “Small States: Persisting Despite Doubts,” 46. 
7 
1. Balance of Power Theory 
The balance of power theory is a political theory of international relations that 
focuses on explaining states’ actions to maintain an existing distribution of power.15 In a 
self-help system, states wishing to survive and compensate for external disequilibrium are 
induced to play the balance of power game.16  Seeking protection from strong powers 
whose superior resources pose a threat to their survival, states mobilize the means 
available to them both internally (by intensifying economic and military buildups) and 
externally (by forming or enlarging their own alliances or weakening opposing 
alliances).17  
According to Kenneth Waltz, states take as their end goals the maximization of 
security, not power.18 Excessive accumulation of power is self-defeating, as it triggers 
balancing against the rising power.19 Because states strive merely to maintain their 
positions in the system, once the status quo is disrupted they usually engage in balancing 
rather than bandwagoning behavior.20 Waltz feels that small “secondary states” join the 
weaker side and will balance against the threatening major power, because they are safer 
on the opposite side and their moderate capabilities are more valued there.21  
However, Waltz argues that small states have little impact on the international 
system; it is major states that define international politics. His balance of power theory 
thus revolves around the great powers, leaving small states on the sidelines. Waltz 
believes this does not pose a problem for the theory, because, in his words, international 
politics is “mostly about inequalities anyway.”22 
 
 
                                                 
15 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 117. 
16 Ibid., 121. 
17 Ibid., 118. 
18 Ibid., 126. 
19 Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World–Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” 
International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), 158. 
20 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 126. 
21 Ibid., 127. 
22 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 94. 
8 
2. Balance of Threat Theory 
The balancing behavior of small states does not rest on power considerations 
alone. According to Stephen Walt, alliance formation is multilevel and multidimensional. 
Walt argues that alignment decisions are largely determined by weighing the perceptions 
of threats, which, in turn, are the product of four different sources: aggregate power, 
proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions.23 He believes that states 
overwhelmingly tend to balance rather than bandwagon.  They prefer alignment against 
potential threats and preservation of their freedom of action over subordination to a 
hegemon whose intentions they cannot be sure of.24      
Walt feels that small states have greater likelihood of bandwagoning because they 
are more vulnerable to pressure and because they add only negligible capabilities to 
either side.25 Small states are especially sensitive to a proximate threatening power. 
When the offensive power of a threatening neighbor would permit rapid conquest, the 
small states may “see little hope in resisting.”26 Furthermore, small states are likely to 
bandwagon when allies to balance with are simply unavailable or when they are not 
viable.27 At the same time, Walt suggests that states are unlikely to bandwagon if the 
threatening power is perceived as “unalterably aggressive.”28 He emphasizes that 
circumstances in which small states will bandwagon with the threatening power are rare, 
suggesting that such cases give priority to a short-term perspective.29 This was famously 
presented, albeit in a slightly different context, in Machiavelli’s injunction: “A prince 
ought never to make common cause with one more powerful than himself, unless 
necessity forces him to it.”30   
                                                 
23 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, 
Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), 8-9. 
24 Ibid., 15. 
25 Ibid., 17. 
26 Ibid., 11. 
27 Ibid., 17-18. 
28 Ibid., 13. 
29 Ibid., 18. 
30 Niccolo Machiavelli, Quoted in Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Security of States in the Third World 
(Australia: Australian National University, 1982), 53. 
9 
Walt argues that all four sources of threat are important in considering a state’s 
alliance choices, but “one cannot say a priori which sources of threat will be most 
important in any given case.”31 He also believes that other factors of alliance formation, 
such as ideology, instruments of foreign aid and penetration, are weak determinants of 
alignment.32 Walt argues that these factors rarely create alliances because security 
considerations take precedence over them. He, however, feels that these factors can 
enhance the effectiveness of existing alliances.33    
Views on the general tendency of small states to balance or bandwagon appear 
even more divided. Mearsheimer, a leading offensive realist, argues that bandwagoning is 
extremely rare because it violates the basic principle that “states maximize their relative 
power.”34 Mearsheimer, however, admits that small states “may have no other choice” 
but to bandwagon.35 Still others, like David Garnham, argue that there is no strong 
correlation between the size of the country and its propensity to balance or bandwagon.36 
Efraim Karsh argues that small states draw their security “from the reciprocal 
neutralization of the great powers” and that balance of power is “most desirable” for 
small states.37 Talukder Maniruzzaman and Eric Labs believe that balancing against a 
threatening power is the best strategy for small states.38 Still others caution against such 
generalizations and suggest taking into account the “constellation in which the small state 
functions.”39  
This is a reminder of the importance of the regional security subsystems which 
the small states, as a result of their historical roots and geographic imperatives, 
                                                 
31 Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 13. 
32 Ibid., 19-32. 
33 Ibid., 33. 
34 Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security,” 162-
163.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Vayrynen, “Small States: Persisting Despite Doubts,” 46. 
37 Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London: Routledge, 1988), 98-101. 
38 Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Security of States in the Third World, 37-51. See also Ann-Sofie 
Dahl, “To Be or Not to Be Neutral: Swedish Security Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era,” in The National 
Security of Small States in a Changing World, ed. Efraim Inbar and Gabriel Sheffer (London: Frank Cass, 
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participate in by default. Alignment with superpowers to balance against regional threats 
was a common practice during the Cold War.40 With the end of bipolar system, the small 
states’ fears of superpower domination were refocused on the dangers of regional powers 
which, in the current international order, experience greater freedom of action.41 In light 
of dormant and active regional enmities, one can therefore reasonably expect that 
regional threats will continue to influence the balancing or bandwagoning decisions of 
small states in the post-Cold War environment.  
3. Regional Subsystems as a Level of Analysis 
The regional level of security, although often neglected in international relations 
literature, is extremely important for understanding the security of small states and 
analyzing their alignment choices. Barry Buzan is often credited with placing due 
emphasis on the regional level. He suggests adding an intermediate level of analysis 
between the international system and the state, a level populated with “regional security 
complexes.”42  
Security complexes represent a set of states “whose primary security concerns 
link together sufficiently closely” that the national security of each state cannot be 
understood apart from other states in the complex.43 Buzan writes that the “fate” of those 
states “is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.”44 
Regional security complexes, therefore, are “an empirical phenomenon with historical 
and geopolitical roots.”45  
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Buzan believes that the security interdependencies within the complex can be of 
varying strength and can reflect mutual trust or rivalry.46 He believes that the security of 
small states in the complex is “bound up in the pattern of larger states,” but that by the 
impact of their alignments, minor states can become a source of threat to larger powers.47 
Buzan admits that the task of locating the boundaries of security complexes is a difficult 
one, but argues that it is better to have a disputed conception of boundaries than have no 
such conception at all.48 The task of defining security complexes becomes even more 
complicated when one considers overlapping regional dynamics and the influence of 
external powers on security complexes.49 Despite these problems, it appears that the 
regional level of analysis and the analytical instrument of a security complex are relevant 
and applicable to the South Caucasus.  
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, three small states—Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia—have regained their independence. Their interrelationships with one 
another and the three regional powers—Russia, Turkey and Iran—have come to 
significantly influence the whole Southern Caucasian security complex. Moreover, the 
autonomous regions within Georgia and Azerbaijan have also had a huge impact on the 
security complex, affecting the nature of the security interrelationships between Georgia 
and Russia as well as between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and between them and Turkey. 
Furthermore, an external major power, the United States, has increasingly become a 
focus of the Southern Caucasian security complex.  
Ideally, an analysis of Armenia’s foreign policy behavior, its alignment decisions 
and its national strategies would consider the security interdependencies of all states in 
the security complex, including the United States, whose significance for the region is 
“readily comparable to that of the three regional powers.”50 However, space and time 
limitations make this challenging task impractical.  Therefore, this study focuses on 
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security interrelationships between Armenia and other states of the complex, only 
tangentially analyzing the security interdependencies among the other states within the 
complex. 
C. NEOLIBERALISM 
The neoliberal school of thought provides an alternative framework for 
understanding the politics of interdependence in the modern world and behavior of small 
states with great powers. The neoliberal view also helps with analysis of the great power 
interactions and with highlighting the avenues for cooperation on issues that might have 
direct or indirect influence on small state security. The model shares some fundamental 
assumptions with the neorealist school. Both schools of thought consider rational states to 
be primary actors that operate in an anarchic, self-help environment; both highlight the 
role of military power in providing for security. Although neoliberals do not necessarily 
rule out the use of military power in extreme security situations, they believe security, in 
traditional parlance, is not at the top of state’s agenda.51 Instead, they emphasize the low 
fungibility of military power and its high costs in an interdependent environment.52 
The neoliberal school accentuates the role of processes and international 
regimes53 in fostering interstate cooperation. It views states as rational egoists among 
whom international cooperation develops because of absolute, not relative, gains. 
According to Keohane and Nye, cooperation among states is possible in highly iterative 
interactions where the existence of shared interests in dense “policy space” induces 
formation of international regimes.54 Actors establish regimes because they anticipate 
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less uncertainty.55 Importantly, the actors’ egoistic self-interests, exogenous norms and 
principles, usage and custom, as well as knowledge, can all serve as causal variables for 
international regimes.56 
Neoliberals maintain that by linking issues in regimes, and the regimes in 
networks, an iterated, open-ended situation of Prisoners’ Dilemma is created in which the 
pursuit of myopic self-interest becomes unattractive.57 These linkages imply that 
disturbance of a regime will likely produce costly effects for other international regimes 
as well. Keohane argues that states in an interdependent world are also concerned with 
the production of “collective bads” and the costs of acquiring “bad reputations.”58 The 
rules of regimes, therefore, enforce norms of reciprocity and encourage “a convergence 
of expectations” that helps states to reach compromise.59   
Neoliberals contend that today’s multidimensional social, economic and 
ecological interdependence affects world politics and state behavior.60 All countries, 
whether big or small, have to tackle a growing number of problems, including drug 
trafficking, climate change, flows of refugees, terrorism, financial flows and other 
security issues requiring coordinated government actions. This implies that the former 
Cold War rivals, Russia (the main heir of the USSR) and the United States, might have 
some issues of mutual concern that can be linked through interwoven organizational 
regimes and networks.   
In the post Cold War environment, the perception of Russia as an aggressive rival 
threatening the West with nuclear missiles has changed dramatically. Now, arguably, the 
West recognizes Russia as a partner willing to cooperate on a broad spectrum of 
economic and security issues ranging from energy partnership to disarmament to 
terrorism. For the small states, the implications for such West-East cooperative 
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engagements are far reaching. Multiple Russo-American interactions and mutuality of 
interests open up avenues for the small states to simultaneously engage in cooperative, 
positive interactions with both powers, with the aim of complementing, not contradicting, 
their interests.  
1. Sensitivity and Vulnerability 
The neoliberal theory is also helpful for understanding how small states, given 
their interactions and interdependencies, can obtain power and influence over larger 
powers. Interdependence, neoliberals argue, is not necessarily a situation of evenly 
balanced mutual dependence, nor is it often a case of pure dependence.  Instead it is 
usually a situation between those two extremes, an asymmetrical interdependence, which 
is the major source of power in the modern interdependent world.61 Keohane and Nye 
believe that interdependence “always involves costs,” because it restricts state 
autonomy.62 However, they argue, it is almost impossible to avoid interdependence, and 
futile to make a priori cost-benefit calculations for such relationships.63   
Keohane and Nye distinguish two dimensions of interdependence: sensitivity and 
vulnerability. They define sensitivity as the “degree of responsiveness” within an 
unchanged policy framework.64 This type of interdependence can be economic or social, 
as well as political and can be reflected in demonstrations and political actions triggered 
by distress.65 Sensitivity, however, reflects the immediate effects of external changes and 
its political consequences can be mitigated if the cost of interdependence can be altered 
through policy change.66  
The latter aspect reveals the vulnerability dimension of interdependence, which 
depends on “relative availability and costliness of alternatives” obtainable through policy 
alteration.67 Vulnerability can be measured through calculation of the costs of making 
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effective policy adjustments over time.68 Keohane and Nye believe that addressing long-
term vulnerabilities requires domestic consensus, political will, and resource 
availability.69 The most important source of power, therefore, comes from the 
vulnerability dimension of interdependence, although both sensitivity and vulnerability 
have huge political importance.70 The political influence of sensitivity matters more if 
dissatisfied states cannot alter their policies relatively quickly. 
Keohane and Nye emphasize that interdependencies can be manipulated, but they 
contend such actions may lead to counterstrategies, including the possibility of a military 
confrontation.71 Military force, however, is extremely costly to apply, and they believe 
such a strategy is an “act of desperation.”72 Obviously, this caution makes sense in a 
small state context only if the asymmetrical interdependence favors the small state and if 
the aggressor is the great power. However, this appears not to be the case with small 
states in the South Caucasus, since asymmetrical interdependence in many energy 
resources favors Russia, the great regional power.   
For the purpose of this analysis, it seems that Armenia has the potential to 
exercise power resources which it can manipulate to achieve an advantage in other issues, 
linking them through organizational regimes and networks. At the same time, the other 
side of equation should be considered—the asymmetrical interdependencies that are 
favorable to major regional players. Exploring the dimensions of vulnerability and 
sensitivity for Armenia’s interdependent engagements will help to demarcate its space for 
political maneuver and to suggest strategies to minimize the chance of being 
manipulated. Here one should also consider that asymmetrical interdependencies are a 
measure of “potential power” that provide only “an approximation of initial bargaining 
advantages.”73 The translation of potential power resources into power over outcomes  
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depends on the bargaining process and such factors as coordination within the 
government, national cohesion and the ability to tolerate suffering.74 One thing, however, 
is clear—“a lot is often lost” in the process of such translation.75 
To understand the interdependent relations between Armenia and major regional 
players, such as Russia and the United States, it is necessary to explore the regional 
policies of those players. The analysis of evolution of Russian and U.S. regional policies 
will help to identify their long-term interests in the South Caucasus and trends in their 
strategies. In turn, this will help to single out opportunities and threats that great-power 
policies pose to Armenia’s own national interests. The next chapter starts with an analysis 
of evolution of Russia’s policies towards the Transcaucasus. 
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III. RUSSIA’S INTERESTS IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS 
When the Soviet Union went into the “dustbin of history,”76 the domestic affairs 
of the USSR suddenly became transformed into foreign policy questions for the Newly 
Independent States. Owing to its vast military resources and place in international 
organizations, Russia immediately took a more prominent position in the international 
system than any other Soviet successor country.77 It remains a significant regional power 
with vital interests and a military, political and economic presence in the Caucasus ready 
to exert influence on the region’s newly independent small states—Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia.78  
Immediately after the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s foreign policy in general, 
and its regional policy regarding the Transcaucasus in particular, was marked by “chaos 
and zigzags.”79 Military and political leaders had differing understandings of what the 
Kremlin’s policies towards the region should be; when they disagreed, they formed and 
executed their own policies.80 Internal and external developments during Yeltsin’s 
Presidency triggered radical changes in Russia’s security policies throughout much of 
1990s. Under Putin’s leadership, Moscow’s policies towards the region continued to 
change, with significant repercussions for the Transcaucasus.  
Moscow’s complex regional policies have become the subject of conflicting 
interpretations by policy analysts. For many pundits, Russia’s overall strategy and its 
long-term interests in the Transcaucasus remain largely unclear and hard to predict.81 
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Indeed, its uncoordinated and contradictory actions in the Transcaucasus have come to 
resemble the pieces of a “jigsaw puzzle”82 that one might never be able to assemble 
properly. This chapter will nevertheless make an attempt to do so, exploring Moscow’s 
foreign policy fluctuations as well as its main interests in the Transcaucasus. Strategic 
and political factors that influence Russian national security decision making, as well as 
Russia’s leading documents on national security issues, will be analyzed for this purpose. 
A. EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE 
TRANSCAUCASUS 
1. 1991-1994 
The immediate reaction to the dismantling of the USSR was a “state of 
confusion” in Moscow, which continued through the initial period of state building in 
1991-1992.83 It was the start of a search for a clear, widely accepted national identity, 
which Russia desperately lacked after the communist ideology of the USSR was 
discredited.84 In fact, Russia had to undergo the process of redefining itself before it 
could formulate policies towards other Soviet successor states.85 This meant that Moscow 
gave little priority to the Transcaucasus, essentially leaving it in the hands of the former 
Soviet military stationed in the region.86 
From mid-1992, the foreign policy debate in Russia was shaped by two 
competing schools of thought: the reformist “Euro-Atlanticist” and the more imperialistic 
“Neo-Eurasianist.”87 The former, represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei 
Kozyrev and supported by President Yeltsin, initially dominated the political scene. 
Under its influence, Russian national security policies acquired an “apparently pro-
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Western tilt.”88 From the Euro-Atlanticist perspective, the Russian role in the “Near 
Abroad” was to be a civilizer in the context of a broad Western partnership that would 
keep Russia aligned with the Western club.89  
These policies, however, were soon criticized not only by communist and 
nationalist political circles, but also by many centrists and democrats, who saw the Euro-
Atlanticist perspective as lacking a sense of national interest.90 Many of the critics 
believed that Russian civilization was superior to Western materialistic culture. They 
disputed the view of Russia as a “normal power” and maintained that Moscow must keep 
an independent foreign policy direction.91 They also believed that Russia should focus on 
creating a “belt of friendly countries” from the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) to serve as a “buffer zone.”92 They argued that the security of this zone should be 
ensured by stabilizing the internal situation of those states and maintaining control over 
their internal and external borders.93 
With time, as the government failed to create “a new Russia” integrated into the 
civilized West, popular support gradually shifted toward conservative, Neo-Eurasianist 
worldviews, which were already popular among the military leadership, the intelligence 
community and the parliament.94 It is important to note that the amended Soviet-era 
constitution of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) did not provide a 
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national security and foreign policy decision making.95 This problem prepared the ground 
for political battles that beset Moscow in 1993 and “permeated all aspects of 
policymaking” there.96  
In order to advance their policies in Moscow, the “hard liners” contributed to the 
intensification of conflicts in the periphery.97 For instance, when an armed conflict 
erupted between Georgia and its autonomous republic Abkhazia in 1992, influential 
Russian political circles lend their support for the Abkhazians.98 Moreover, the 
decomposition of the Soviet Armed Forces during this period resulted in military leaders 
and civilian personnel serving their own interests in the ethnic conflicts in the 
Transcaucasus.99 Russian foreign policy in the region became not only decentralized, but 
also somewhat “privatized.” As a result, it appeared increasingly inconsistent and 
confused.100 
In 1992 and 1993, a number of domestic and external factors emerged that led 
Yeltsin’s government towards the assertive Neo-Eurasianist perspective and the adoption 
of Russia’s Monroe Doctrine. As 1992 progressed, the power struggle between Yeltsin 
and the conservative parliament crystallized into a rivalry, intensifying Yeltsin’s move 
towards a revisionist policy that would attract the military to his camp and thus deprive 
his opponents of their powerful supporters.101 At the same time, Russia’s search for a 
new identity independently facilitated the transformation of Euro-Atlanticists.102 Foreign 
policy change was also triggered by external factors, like the intensification of regional 
conflicts in Russia’s southern belt, as well as by growing activism by regional countries  
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with their own “version of Eurasianism.”103 In the Transcaucasus, the most notable was 
Turkey, which was supported by the United States and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in its pursuit of regional leadership.104 
The end of “romantic Euro-Atlanticism” was reflected in Kremlin’s rhetoric. 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev emphasized that “Russia cannot agree to a subordinate global 
role.”105 He went so far as to accuse NATO of pursuing objectives that were “essentially 
unchanged” from the Cold War era.106 The Yeltsin-Kozyrev “updated” strategy 
unambiguously emphasized Russia’s desire for reintegration within the CIS.107 Yeltsin 
spoke of a need for international organizations to “grant Russia special powers as a 
guarantor of peace and stability in the region of the former union.”108 The two leading 
security documents of the period, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept and the Military 
Doctrine of 1993, bore the stamp of this shift in policies. The Military Doctrine, in 
particular, envisaged the possibility of stationing troops outside Russian territory to 
ensure a ceasefire across the former Soviet territory.109 
During this period a consensus developed on Russia’s policies towards the 
Transcaucasus. The policymakers recognized security linkages between the North and 
South Caucasus—instability and conflict in the Transcaucasus had the potential to 
destabilize Russian North Caucasus.110 Moreover, they saw the Transcaucasus as a 
“buffer zone” between the North Caucasus and the Islamic world to the south.111 The 
strategists also agreed that the region might serve either as the “bridge or the barrier for 
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Russia’s relations with the Middle East.” If controlled by Moscow, the region could 
permit effective projection of Russian influence to the Middle East.112 The 
Transcaucasus came to be viewed as an important energy and transport corridor 
connecting the West to the energy-rich Central Asian part of the “Southern Tier,”113 
bypassing Russia. The loss of the Transcaucasus to external influence, therefore, was 
seen as a prelude to the loss of control over the entire Southern Tier, which in geo-
strategic and geo-economic terms is of vital importance to Moscow.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that Russia came to view its competition with foreign influences in the 
Transcaucasus along the lines of a zero-sum game.114 
From this perspective, Turkish activism and the revival of pan-Turkish ideas 
carried serious implications for the security architecture of the whole Southern Tier.115 
Because of Russia’s Turkic populations, Turkish opportunism was also threatening to 
destabilize Russia itself.116 Importantly, Turkey’s unconcealed hostility towards its 
Transcaucasian neighbor Armenia became the source of a convergence of Russian and 
Armenian threat perceptions. Henry Hale notes that the former Soviet countries which 
face a third-party threat see Russia as potentially important ally. He writes that “the 
strategy of any given state . . . depends on whether this third-party threat is more serious 
than that posed by Russia itself and whether the state sees Russia as genuinely interested 
in resisting this threat.”117 
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During the late Soviet period, Russia had “relatively openly” supported 
Azerbaijan in the conflict over Nagorno (or Mountainous) Karabakh, arguably to 
preserve the Soviet Union from disintegration.118 Until August 1991, the Azerbaijani 
leadership remained firmly attached to Soviet camp, while the leadership in Armenia had 
effectively distanced themselves from the USSR. Yerevan, however, soon realized that 
further worsening of relations with Russia would leave Armenia on its own vis-à-vis 
Turkey, which is an ardent supporter of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 
has a long history of hostility towards Armenia.119 This third-party threat was perceived 
to be much more serious because there was a “real threat of Turkish military action in 
response to Armenia’s war with Azerbaijan.”120  
The weighing of threats forced Yerevan to move to counterbalance the Turkish 
threat and to seek a new security structure that would ensure the country’s survival and 
recreate the security environment that had existed on its border during the Soviet era.121 
This could be achieved only through alignment with Russia, which itself had a genuine 
interest in resisting Turkish activism in the region. Armenia moved to normalize its 
relations with Russia and in May 1992 became the only Southern Caucasian country to 
willingly join the CIS Collective Security Treaty.122 During the same year, agreements 
were signed to allow the stationing of Russian troops and guards to patrol the borders 
with non-CIS countries.123 As a result, Russia came closer to its own regional objective 
of filling the post-Cold War regional “security vacuum” with its military presence.124 
Russia, however, realized that effective control over the region required a more activist 
approach towards two other Transcaucasian states—Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
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During 1993-1994, the two major components of Russia’s new foreign policy—
prioritization of the near abroad and maintenance of regional predominance—were 
translated into a strategy of “aggressive reintegration”125 of the Transcaucasus into the 
CIS.126 This phase had its distinctive features: reintroducing or maintaining Russian 
troops in the region under the rubric of peacekeeping or through agreements on basing 
rights; keeping the governments of the Southern Caucasian countries weak and 
susceptible to manipulation; playing regional powers like Iran and Turkey against each 
other to maximize Moscow’s influence; forming a “leapfrog alliance”127 with Iran as an 
additional safeguard for Russian security; reasserting Russia’s informational powers and 
cultural influence; integrating all the Transcaucasian states into the CIS security structure 
by “encouraging” them to join the Collective Security Treaty;  and constraining the ties 
of Southern Caucasian states with their neighbors and other regional players.128 This last 
approach was motivated by the need to prevent the formation of regional alliances that 
might exclude and isolate Russia.129 The Kremlin’s new proactive approach was soon 
confirmed as quite effective.  
Indeed, the year 1993 was marked by “improvement” in relations between Russia 
and the two Transcaucasian countries, Azerbaijan and Georgia, that had previously 
shown “rebellious tendencies”130 in regard to their former patron’s domination. It has 
been suggested that the overthrow of Azerbaijani nationalist, anti-Russian President 
Elchibey by rebellious army commander Suret Husseinov in 1993 occurred at Moscow’s 
prompting.131 The subsequent improvement in Russian-Azeri ties under the leadership of 
Heidar Aliev was followed by cancellation of a series of oil contracts that Elchibey had 
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signed with Western companies, and, later in 1993, by Azerbaijan joining the CIS.132 In 
the same year the collapse of the Georgian Army in Abkhazia, along with armed conflict 
between the followers of overthrown nationalist President Gamsakhurdia and supporters 
of elected President Shevardnadze compelled the latter to turn to Moscow for help. 
Moscow’s support arrived with significant strings attached to it. Shevardnadze was 
compelled to join the CIS and allow Russian military bases in Georgian territory.133 As a 
result of those events, Russia acquired a dominant position in the Transcaucasus. The 
Russian victory, however, turned to be short-lived. What followed is often described as a 
“gradual retreat” from the Transcaucasus.134 
2. 1994-1999 
Despite Russia’s willingness to keep Georgia and Azerbaijan under its control, it 
appeared that Moscow only partly achieved that objective. Russia’s policies towards the 
Transcaucasus remained “reactive and ad hoc.”135 The war in the North Caucasus, the 
failure to establish order domestically, and Russia’s deteriorating economic and military 
might severely limited Moscow’s “ability to deliver on its promises and threats.”136 
Moscow was unable to stop the anti-Russian rhetoric and increasingly pro-Western tilt in 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. As time went on, the gap between Russia’s intentions and 
capabilities continued to grow. The tools left at Kremlin’s disposal were “obstructionism”  
(a blunt instrument for long-term maintenance of influence,137) and covert operations. 
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This period was marked by failed coups against the leaders of Azerbaijan and Georgia.138 
It has been suggested that Russia tacitly supported the coup-makers.139   
In 1997, both countries joined the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and 
Moldova) group in opposition to Russian interests and with a goal of “strengthening their 
independence.”140 Despite Russian obstructionism, Georgia and Azerbaijan also boosted 
their cooperation with Turkey and the U.S. on the deployment of pipelines to bring 
Azerbaijani oil to Turkey through Georgia, bypassing Russian territory.141 Azerbaijan 
opened a discussion on stationing American and Turkish bases on its soil and Georgia 
declared its aspiration for NATO membership.142 Interestingly, during this period, the 
increasing interactions of the Southern Caucasian states with the outside world made it 
more difficult for Russia to intervene aggressively and helped those countries to lessen 
their dependency on Russia.143  
In 1999, Azerbaijan and Georgia decided not to extend their membership in the 
Collective Security Treaty (CST). Azerbaijan stated that the CST was not effective for 
ensuring its security and territorial integrity. Shevardnadze announced that his country 
refused to extend its participation in the CST “because it only exists on paper and there 
are no real practical results whatsoever.”144 By that he meant Russia’s failure to fulfill its 
obligations under the Treaty, including the lack of progress in resolving the Abkhazian 
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conflict and little or no help in modernizing the Georgian Army.145 Armenia, in contrast, 
extended its participation in the Treaty, since the alliance with Russia continued to serve 
its security requirements.146   
3. Russia’s Current Policy 
It is important to note that Russian policy towards the Transcaucasus is guided not 
only by regional and domestic considerations, but also by its general foreign policy 
stance. Some analysts maintain that Moscow’s larger foreign policy concept underwent a 
radical change following NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict and its post-Cold 
War first enlargement in 1999.147 Changes in perceptions of threats are reflected in 
Russia’s leading security documents, which were ratified in 2000 by President Putin.148 
The National Security Concept states that some countries “have stepped up their 
efforts to weaken Russia’s positions in the political, economic, military and other 
spheres.”149 It emphasizes Russia’s support for a multi-polar world, which implies that 
US hegemony is seen as a threat to progress, stability and peace.150 Among Russia’s 
national interests in the international sphere the Concept stresses political, military and 
economic integration within the CIS as a road to reviving its status as a great power.151  
The subordinate documents, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept, 
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similarly reflect an assertive attitude on a global level and towards the CIS.152 The 
Military Doctrine introduces a first-use of nuclear weapons policy, which in some 
pragmatic scenarios of conventional confrontation in the Transcaucasus could mean the 
option of using tactical nuclear weapons against Turkey, Russia’s regional rival.153  
The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 manifests a seemingly ambiguous, 
dualistic approach.  On the one hand it accepted Russia’s internal weakness and the need 
to integrate into the international system, which is dominated by the West. On the other 
hand, it emphasized the objective of reviving Russia’s great power status by 
strengthening ties within the CIS, which has the potential for creating confrontation with 
the West.154 Because of this, some analysts were quick to imply a swing of Russian 
policies under President Putin’s leadership toward “imperial assertiveness” and 
confrontation with the West.155 So lasting was the image of Yeltsin’s Russia as a “paper 
tiger” 156  that other analysts viewed those policy “changes” as merely a rhetorical device 
intended to mask Russia’s weakness and its continuous disengagement and retreat from 
the CIS.157  The nexus between the seeming dualism, however, can be found in the 
increasingly geo-economic focus of Russian foreign policy.158  
The Russian leadership today well understands that revitalization of their 
country’s economy cannot be achieved without integration into the global economy.  It 
appears that President Putin has made a “strategic decision” to achieve that objective 
through cooperation with the West.159 Importantly, the leadership’s strategic thinking has 
been reoriented towards building a modern great power on strong economic 
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foundations—an “independent Moscow-led power center in Eurasia”—through greater 
use of Russia’s comparative advantages.160 President Putin has repeatedly emphasized 
the role of economic power in modern international politics.161 In 2003, during his annual 
televised address to the nation, he said, “[T]here is a tough, competitive battle going on in 
the world. As [sic] different from the past, this battle has moved from the realm of 
military conflict to economic competition.”162  
It is well known that Russia possesses abundant energy resources and that today 
many Western and CIS countries depend heavily on them. From the neoliberal 
perspective, given global trends of increasing energy consumption and the potential 
power of asymmetrical interdependencies, Russia’s focus on economic instruments of 
power is quite likely to give the Kremlin an important strategic advantage in international 
political battles. Increased focus on geo-economics, however, does not mean abandoning 
traditional geopolitical thinking.163 Instead, twenty-first century Moscow’s Realpolitik 
combines and interconnects geopolitics and geo-economics.164 The search for geo-
economic opportunities began in the late 1990s, but it is under Putin’s leadership that the 
management of its economic agenda became the central point of Russia’s foreign policy 
towards the CIS and the international community at large.165 
Dmitri Trenin, a senior analyst at Moscow’s Carnegie Center, has named 
Moscow’s Realpolitik approach towards former Soviet states “Operation CIS.” It rests on 
two main pillars: the strengthening of collective security frameworks, and the 
transformation of Russia into an economic magnet for the former Soviet states through 
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expansion of Russian investment.166 At the same time, the restoration of a new model of 
the Soviet Union is firmly rejected, as the costs of maintaining such an empire would be 
extremely high.167 As Putin noted, “Those who want to restore the Soviet Union . . . have 
no brains.”168 
Russia’s “new strategy” stipulates multi-layer integration processes within the 
CIS through such organizations as the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the 
Single Economic Space (SES), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).169  Along with these more manageable, 
non-CIS-wide programs, which involve “shared neighborhoods,”170 the strategy focuses 
on developing pragmatic, differentiated, bilateral cooperation with former Soviet states 
based on mutual interests.171  
What are the implications of this larger policy line for the Transcaucasus? What 
are Russia’s main interests in the region today? Most analysts agree that under Putin’s 
leadership, Moscow has placed “great strategic importance on maintaining influence” in 
the Transcaucasus.172 They note that Moscow’s Transcaucasian policies have become 
more differentiated, focusing mostly on bilateral relations.173 Although strategic thinking 
has shifted towards greater emphasis on geo-economic dimension of mutual relations, 
geopolitics and military interests continue to rank high among Russia’s regional 
priorities.  
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B. MILITARY-STRATEGIC INTERESTS 
Traditionally, Moscow has been interested in preventing strategic penetration and 
the formation of a security vacuum in the Transcaucasus, and it appears that these 
concerns are as valid today as in the past.174 According to Sergey Markedonov of the 
Institute of Political and Military Analysis, ensuring stability in the Transcaucasus is a 
“fundamental condition of Russia’s peaceful domestic development and the preservation 
of its integrity.”175 Moscow views the North Caucasian republics and the Transcaucasian 
countries as indivisible part of the same “security complex,” and therefore, it is interested 
in building stability in the region as well as preventing or limiting foreign penetration into 
the Transcaucasus.176 Russian strategic thinking has traditionally linked this objective 
with the need to maintain military presence in the region.177  
1. The Organization of the Collective Security Treaty: Armenian-
Russian Military Cooperation 
The CIS Collective Security Treaty, signed in 1992 by Armenia, Russia and the 
four Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, was the 
first step in maintaining Russia’s armed presence in the Transcaucasus.178 Initially, 
Russian political and military leadership thought that the CIS would develop towards an 
organization similar to the USSR, with a unified Commonwealth Armed Forces.179 
However, in early 1992 the illusions of CIS forces rapidly evaporated, after a significant 
number of states resisted the idea and pressed ahead with the creation of their own armed 
forces.180 Moreover, a few countries that signed the CIS “Agreement of Supplying the 
Armed Forces” had major differences on fundamental issues of central financing and 
logistics.  
Recognizing the realities of disagreements, the Russian military delegation 
proposed the Collective Security Treaty during the Tashkent summit in May 1992, 
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hoping at the same time to encourage Yeltsin to create a Russian Ministry of Defense, a 
move that Yeltsin had earlier resisted.181 The Tashkent summit and, subsequently, the 
creation of the Russian Ministry of Defense (with the latter’s refusal to contribute 
resources to the Commonwealth forces) became major factors that permanently 
handicapped efforts to reincarnate the Soviet Military as the CIS Armed Forces.182 
 The CST became an important regional security entity in 1993, after the 
accession of Azerbaijan and Georgia, which brought all the Southern Caucasian countries 
into Russia’s security orbit. It is important to note that the Treaty provided mutual 
security guarantees to its signatories, but it did not address problems within the member-
states, so the conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, South-Ossetia and Abkhazia remained 
unresolved.183 Importantly, Baku refused to allow Russian troops in Azerbaijan, thus 
turning the 1993 withdrawal of the Soviet forces a permanent reality. Moreover, during 
the second half of the 1990s, Azerbaijan and Tbilisi increasingly joined efforts in 
courting NATO, Turkey and the U.S. as guarantors of their security.184  
During the same period, Armenian-Russian military ties continued to develop and 
strengthen. Their bilateral relations matured to a point that eleven protocols on military 
cooperation were signed in a single year (1996).185 These protocols covered a wide range 
of issues, from joint military exercises to air defense cooperation to military training and 
research.186 In April 1997, the Armenian Parliament and the Russian Duma ratified a 25 
year agreement on stationing Russian military bases in Armenia.187 The ratification of the 
treaty, which had been signed by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Levon Ter-Petrosian in 
1995, was delayed by the Duma “until the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, in order to 
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avoid the risk of Russian military involvement in the conflict.”188 However, the 
increasingly anti-Russian stance in Azerbaijan and Georgia highlighted Armenia’s role as 
Russia’s only reliable ally in the region, resulting in overwhelming Duma support for the 
treaty. In his report to the Duma, Russia’s deputy foreign minister Boris Pastukhov 
characterized the mission of Russian troops in Armenia as “ensuring, jointly with 
Armenian forces, the security of Armenia.”189 He praised the agreement as “protecting 
Russian strategic interests in the Transcaucasus . . . where external forces are doing their 
utmost to prevent Russia’s close cooperation with the region’s countries.”190 Comparing 
Armenia to Georgia, Pastukhov slammed official Tbilisi, saying that “extremist forces 
oppose the Russian military presence” there.191 
In August 1997, Armenia and Russia signed a bilateral Treaty of “Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance,” which formalized their already mature military 
ties.192 Under the terms of the Treaty, the signatories pledged to consult each other and 
provide mutual military support if “either side is attacked or considers itself threatened by 
a third party.”193 The sides also pledged to “jointly protect Armenia’s borders with non-
CIS countries, proceeding from Russia’s and Armenia’s security interests and CIS 
collective security interests.”194 The Treaty was signed for a 25-year period, with 
automatic ten-year extensions, unless denounced by either side with one year’s notice.  
The importance of the Treaty for Russia can hardly be exaggerated. It enabled 
Russia to maintain its forces and forward-positioned military hardware in the 
Transcaucasus in a “friendly environment.”195 Armenia’s location in the Transcaucasus 
has high geopolitical value for Russia, since it is seen as “the only wedge between Turkey 
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and Azerbaijan and the rest of the Turkic world.”196 The Treaty was also intended to 
strengthen the Collective Security Treaty and to provide a basis for similar bilateral 
agreements with specific CST members. Importantly, in 1999, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
refused to extend their participation in the CST. As a result, Armenia was left as Russia’s 
“only ally in the south”197 and the only CST member in the region, thereby reinforcing 
“Moscow’s dependence on Armenia.”198 
In 2002, the CST was reorganized into a political-military Organization of the 
Collective Security Treaty (CSTO) in order to bring its “activities and procedures to a 
higher level”199 and to address “new threats and challenges: international terrorism, 
illegal narcotics and transnational crime.”200 The legal charter of the Organization 
included a mutual defense provision, similar to Article 5 of NATO Charter.201 The 
signatories of the CSTO agreed to create a joint command structure headquartered in 
Moscow, a Joint Staff operational in Kyrgyzstan, and to upgrade the rapid reaction force 
established in 2001 for the Central Asian security region.  
The member-states also agreed to set up a common air defense system, to improve 
communications, intelligence gathering and sharing.202 Moreover, the signatories decided 
to achieve greater coordination of security, defense and foreign policies on regional and 
international developments.203 Russia pledged to provide military education to cadets and 
junior officers from the CSTO states at reduced prices and agreed to supply military 
equipment developed by Russian manufacturers to other CSTO members at Russia’s 
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domestic rates.204 It has been suggested that standardized military training based on the 
Russian model and “accelerated militarization” of Central Asian and Caucasian regions 
provide additional opportunities for Russia to enhance its influence and limit Western 
involvement there.205 Additionally, it is thought that in the future, customers of Russian 
military equipment are likely to depend on Russia for spare parts, weapons and 
ammunition.206  
As far as the “Caucasus security district”207 is concerned, the military component 
appears to be the cornerstone of the Organization.208 As a member of the CSTO, 
Armenia buys Russian military equipment at Russia’s domestic prices. For instance, it 
has been reported that in May 2004, Armenia acquired two Il-76 military transports at 
discounted prices.209 Armenia actively participates in CSTO command and control 
training and annual air defense exercises. Joint air defense is one of the most important 
elements of cooperation within the CSTO. Russian forces in Armenia provide air defense 
with an aviation group of MiG-29 jetfighters and advanced S300 air defense batteries.210 
There are about 4,000 Russian troops in Armenia, more than half of whom are locally-
recruited Armenian citizens.211 Along with the military education that Armenian officers 
receive in Russia, local recruitment is an important source of training on modern Russian 
weaponry.212  
It is important to note that the creation of the CSTO is consistent with Putin’s 
strategy of reintegrating Russia within the CIS. The Organization has an ambitious 
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agenda and is determined to play a significant role in Eurasian security.213 In 2003 the 
Organization launched operations entitled “Canal” to discover and block channels for 
trafficking narcotics and their precursors.214 In 2004, the CSTO’s Rapid Reaction Force 
was tested in an “extensive military anti-terrorist exercise” named Rubezh-2004.215 The 
following year a large-scale command-staff training exercise of the Joint Air-Defense 
System was conducted together with Rubezh-2005 maneuvers in Central Asia. In 2005, 
member-states agreed to develop joint peacekeeping forces and expressed their desire to 
cooperate with NATO on emergency management and drug fighting operations.216 
Additionally, Russia is reported to have allocated sizeable funds to develop the military 
infrastructure in its Central Asian and Armenian bases.217 
Despite CSTO’s progress, some analysts are skeptical of its future, citing 
problems of “dubious multilateralism,” “dysfunctional composition,” and technical as 
well as financial difficulties.218 They maintain that the unity of the CSTO is based more 
on members’ pragmatic considerations, rather than a commonality of interests or 
consensus on external threat perceptions.219 In contrast, others have described the CSTO 
as the “only guarantee of security in the CIS region.”220 The reality, however, is that 
despite the lack of tangible progress in the past, the CSTO “seems to be making changes 
for the better.”221 Importantly, the future of the Organization, as J. Saat argues, will 
depend significantly on the mutuality of member’s interests and their genuine desire to 
cooperate.  
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2. Russia’s Military Presence in Georgia and Azerbaijan 
Russia has a mixed record of success in its military ties with two other 
Transcaucasian countries.  Russian relations are improving with Azerbaijan, and have 
generally deteriorated with Georgia.222 In 2002, Azerbaijan consented to a ten-year lease 
that allows Russia to maintain a huge Soviet-era radar installation at Gabala and to station 
up to 1,500 Russian troops there.223 Gabala is believed to be a “vital military 
establishment”224 for Russia. The radar station is a $10 billion investment and is “capable 
of monitoring air traffic over Turkey, Iran, China, India, Iraq, Pakistan and much of 
northern Africa.”225 In February 2006, Ilham Aliev and Putin agreed to intensify their 
bilateral military-technical cooperation, instructing their governments to “improve the 
legal framework . . . and come up with a plan of appropriate practical steps.”226 Although 
Azerbaijan aspires to NATO membership, it has been careful not to provoke Russian 
fears and has denounced any plans for stationing of NATO troops in Azerbaijan.227  
Russia also maintains military bases in Georgia and peacekeepers in Georgia’s 
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.228 Importantly, Georgia has come to 
view the Russian armed presence as a bridgehead for Moscow’s neo-imperial policy.229 
In 1999, the agreement on Russia’s protection of the Turkish-Georgian border expired 
and Tbilisi refused to extend it, thus ending the presence of Russian border guards in 
Georgia.230 The same year, at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) summit in Istanbul, Russia agreed to reduce its armed presence in Georgia - in 
compliance with the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The 
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agreement required Russia to close its two military bases in Vaziani and Gadauta and to 
reach an agreement on the status of two other bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki during 
2000. Russia partially fulfilled its obligations and after dismantling of the first two bases 
delayed the implementation of the agreement. Russian troops in Batumi and Akhalkalaki 
became a major source of friction in Russian-Georgian bilateral relations in early 2005.  
Russian authorities repeatedly stated that the remaining bases were of little 
importance for Moscow,231 but despite those announcements continued to resist 
withdrawal. According to Pavel Baev, the two remaining bases located in politically 
unstable regions of Georgia could be seen in Moscow as a potential lever of influence 
over Saakashvili’s Georgia.232 Others have suggested that Russia delayed the 
negotiations in order to link them to a Russian-Georgian bilateral treaty and to demand 
legally binding restriction against Georgia’s stationing a third country’s military bases on 
its soil.233 Although Georgian leaders have repeatedly pledged that no third country’s 
military will be based in their country, they refused to include this provision in the 
agreement on the grounds that it would limit their sovereignty.234 In July 2005, Russia 
finally agreed to withdraw its two remaining bases by 2008. It has been suggested that 
Russia was spurred to come to that agreement by pressure from the Georgian legislature 
and strong U.S. and NATO support of demands for a speedy Russian withdrawal.235 
Importantly, Moscow decided to transfer some of the military hardware from the 
Akhalkalaki base to its military base in Gyumri, Armenia, sparking protests from 
Azerbaijani leadership who fear that the equipment will “end up in Armenian hands.”236 
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In early 2006, Russian-Georgian relations reached a new low. Georgia withdrew 
its membership from the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, stating that Tbilisi is not 
interested in the military component of the CIS. Russian Defense Minister Ivanov tried to 
downplay Georgia’s move, presenting it as an insignificant event for the security of the 
CIS.237 Additionally, tensions flared over the issue of Russian peacekeepers in Georgia’s 
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both sides accused each other of 
staging provocations and escalating the situation in South Ossetia. Political authorities in 
Tbilisi argued that the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Georgia poses a threat to 
country’s security and stability and called for their withdrawal.238  
On February 15, 2006, the Georgian Parliament unanimously passed a resolution 
instructing the government “to secure a replacement of the peacekeeping troops of the 
Russian Federation stationed in the former South Ossetian Autonomous District with 
effective international peacekeeping operation.”239 Interestingly, the resolution did not 
set deadlines for the government to execute Parliament’s instructions. Meanwhile, 
Moscow described the attitude of Georgian authorities towards peacekeepers as going 
“beyond all bounds.”240 It warned that the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers may lead 
to “resumption of civil war.”241 Additionally, the parliament of the unrecognized republic 
of Abkhazia ratified a Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship with South Ossetia, and the 
Abkhazian leadership announced that they will provide every support and assistance to 
South Ossetia if the situation escalates there.242    
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It has been suggested that thousands of residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
have been granted Russian citizenship during recent years. Should the situation escalate 
in South Ossetia, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin stated, Russia will 
intervene to “protect its citizens and maintain stability in South Ossetia.”243 Analysts 
believe that this “ostensible interest in protecting human rights is a stalking horse for 
Russia’s military-strategic and economic interests.”244 It is important to note that ethnic 
Russians constitute a very small percentage of the population of the South Caucasus, 
excluding Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Therefore, the issue of 
Russian minorities is not given much weight in Russia’s bilateral relations with Southern 
Caucasian countries, especially given that none of the countries pursues anti-Russian, 
discriminatory policies.245  
3. Islamic Radicals and Terrorists in the Transcaucasus 
In 2001 and 2002, Russian-Georgian relations reached another high-tension mark.  
The tensions were focused on Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, which had become a lawless 
criminal area where Islamic radicals and Chechen militants linked to Al Qaeda found 
shelter.246 With its own large Muslim populations concentrated mainly in the North 
Caucasus, Russia feared that Islamic fundamentalism might spread and destabilize Russia 
itself.247 Moscow was also concerned with drug trafficking and illegal immigration, as 
well as weapons transfer across the Georgian border to Chechen fighters in the North 
Caucasus.  
The crisis over terrorists infiltrating Russia from Pankisi was extensively covered 
in Russia and Georgia, with each side “exchanging charges and counter-charges.”248 
Georgia long denied the presence of Chechen fighters and terrorists on its soil. In 2001,  
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however, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs facilitated the movement of several 
hundred Chechen fighters from Pankisi to the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia, where they 
became involved in fighting with Abkhazian secessionists.249  
The scandal spurred Western criticism and cost the Minister of Internal Affairs his 
job, but even then Shevardnadze described the Chechen commander, Ruslan Gelayev, as 
“a normal thinking and educated man who favors Georgia.”250 Russia officially accused 
Georgia of harboring Chechen terrorists who used Georgia as a staging area for attacks 
on Chechnya.251  Putin noted in 2002 that Russia might be compelled to pursue Chechen 
terrorists into Georgian territory.252  
There were aircraft attacks on the Gorge in 2002, but Russia denied any 
responsibility. The United States unequivocally opposed unilateral Russian intervention 
against Georgia.253 Russian-Georgian tensions decreased somewhat in late 2002, after 
Georgia launched a policing effort in Pankisi and agreed with Russia to have joint border 
patrols.254 It has been suggested, however, that Russia was less interested in confronting 
the terrorist threat than in exploiting the issue to influence the outcome of the political 
transition in Georgia.255 
It is important to note that the threat of radical Islam destabilizing the South 
Caucasus and spreading into Russia is less acute when compared to Central Asia. 
Azerbaijan, a secular, predominantly Muslim country, is considered a potential target for 
radical Islamists. Although the religious confrontation was not strongly pronounced 
during Azerbaijan’s war with Christian Armenians, later economic difficulties and the 
presence of a large number of refugees in Azerbaijan led to calls to “resolve the conflict 
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on an Islamic basis.”256 The Islamic Party of Azerbaijan was reactivated and became 
preoccupied with the idea of Islamic revolution, but its plans were subsequently disrupted 
by state authorities.  
In 1995 Russia officially accused Azerbaijan of harboring Chechen rebels and 
Islamic charities that funded paramilitary camps for the militants. That same year, 
Moscow closed its border with Azerbaijan, an action which had little effect on the issue. 
Russian pressure on Azerbaijan increased in 1999.  This time, however, it resulted in 
Russian-Azerbaijani rapprochement on the issue of Chechen terrorists.257 It has been 
suggested that Heidar Aliev’s concern “over the succession of power in his own family” 
was the driving force behind this demonstration of loyalty.258  
Azerbaijan took some practical measures to identify and neutralize Islamic 
radicals and Chechen terrorists. It closed the Chechen cultural center in Baku, which was 
considered “a front for Chechen separatists.”259 Russia announced that Baku was taking 
efficient measures “aimed at preventing the proliferation of international terrorism in the 
Transcaucasus.”260 More recently, Azerbaijan’s Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs 
reported that during 2005, 43 individuals suspected in terrorist activities were detained 
and six organizations that finance terrorists were shut down in Azerbaijan.261 
Interestingly, there were also reports of Al Qaeda emissaries visiting Azerbaijan to obtain 
components for the production of chemical weapons.262 Analysts, however, believe that 
at present the problem of Islamic radicals “does not seem too serious.”263 
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C. ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
1. Trade Relations 
Over the past decade Russia’s economic importance for the three Transcaucasian 
countries (in terms of volume of trade turnover) has declined, as these countries’ 
economies have gradually adjusted to the dissolution of the interdependent links of the 
Soviet integrated economy.264 The regional blockades, imposed in connection with the 
Chechen and Abkhazian conflicts, the weakness of the Russian economy during much of 
the 1990s, as well as the entrance of foreign players and investors into the regional 
economy, all contributed to the relative decline in Russia’s trade importance for the 
regional countries.265  
The three Transcaucasian countries were highly dependent on trade links with 
Russia and suffered an unprecedented crisis in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union.266 Their economies started to recover slowly and national currencies 
began to stabilize in 1995-1996. All three countries demonstrated an increasing 
propensity to trade and all have managed to redirect their exports and imports from the 
CIS to third-country, mostly European, markets.267 For instance, from 1991 to 2001 the 
share of exports to the CIS countries in total exports of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
decreased, respectively, from 98 percent to 26 percent, from 95 percent to 10 percent and 
from 94 percent to 45 percent.268 A similar trend was observed with regard to their share 
of imports from CIS countries.  
It is important to note that the Southern Caucasian countries generally agreed that 
the CIS was unable to provide serious economic benefits for them. The Agreement on the 
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Free Trade Area was never implemented and in 2006 interstate trade relations were 
regulated by bilateral agreements subject to numerous restrictions.269 None of the 
Southern Caucasian countries was a member of the Russian-dominated EurAsEC in 
2006, and none showed an intention to join it. Analysts believe that joining such free 
trade regimes may result in increasing trade deficits between new members and 
Russia.270  
Although Russia’s overall economic performance in terms of trade turnover is 
“relatively moderate when seen in international context,” Russia still remains an 
important trading partner for each of the three Southern Caucasian states because of its 
economic weight and Soviet-era structural dependencies.271 
 
Table 1. Trade Relations in Countries of the Transcaucasus, 2003 (From: Statistical 
Yearbook of Armenia, 2004. Online. http://www.armstat.am/; Statistical 
Yearbook of Azerbaijan, 2004. Online. http://www.azstat.org/; and Statistical 
Yearbook of Georgia, 2004. Online. http://www.statistics.ge (accessed 14 
February 2006)  
 
Countries Main Export Partners Main Import Partners % of Trade with Russia 









Azerbaijan Italy 51.9% 
France 8.1% 





Turkmenistan 7.2%  
10.2% 
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The volume of bilateral Armenian-Russian and Georgian-Russian trade has 
declined in 2004, comprising only 12.4 percent and 14.5 percent of overall Armenian and 
Georgian external trade, respectively.272 Interestingly, a considerable part of that quite 
modest bilateral trade came from supplies of Russian energy and other natural resources 
and was based on asymmetrical interdependent relationships. As the Armenian President 
once described it, “not much will be left [of bilateral trade] if we exclude the gas 
component from it.”273 It is believed that Moscow’s benefits in such trade relations were 
not so much economic as political, since the overall share of all CIS countries in Russia’s 
external trade turnover was about 16 percent in 2005.274  
2. Energy Relations: A Strategy of Expansion 
The structure of energy relations between Russia and the Transcaucasian 
countries is “highly asymmetric,” which makes most of them dependent on Russia for 
their security, economic development and internal stability.275 From the neoliberal 
perspective the major source of power in the modern world derives from asymmetrical 
interdependence, which can be manipulated to exert political influence over resource-
insufficient countries that cannot respond adequately to the effects of external changes 
(such as the increased price of vital resources, cuts in resource deliveries, etc). Analysts 
believe that such dependent relationships may endanger “the formal independence and 
autonomy of small states with regards to their ability to make decisions.”276 As noted 
above, exploiting this type of dependence is the cornerstone of Russia’s “Operation CIS.”  
With this strategy, Russia aims to achieve control over key strategic areas that are 
important for acquiring a de facto hegemonic position in the CIS. It is thought that 
exploitation of vulnerabilities in key energy sectors (electricity, gas and oil) can provide 
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Moscow with leverage over both the internal political developments and the foreign 
policies of the CIS countries.277 If the regional countries remain dependent on Russia’s 
energy resources and/or on pipeline energy network systems, then they will remain an 
organic part of Moscow’s “sphere of influence.”278 The creation of a common CIS 
market for key energy sectors will inevitably strengthen Russia’s position in the CIS by 
keeping foreign competitors out.  
Under Putin’s leadership, Moscow has tightened its control over corporate energy 
interests and has encouraged their international expansion, bringing their agenda in line 
with the economized foreign policy of the Russian state. Therefore, when it comes to 
energy issues in the Transcaucasus, the Russian state and the Russian energy monopolists 
appear almost as “unitary entities” with overlapping interests that serve the larger geo-
economic and geopolitical goals of the state.279 
Each key energy sector in Russia has its leading company, which acts as a 
vanguard of Russia’s economic expansion, conquering what might become Russia’s 
“liberal empire.”280 The “driving force of expansion” within the electricity sector is the 
Russian electricity monopolist RAO Unified Energy Systems (UES), which is 52.5 
percent state-owned.281 Within the gas sector the force of expansion is Russia’s gas 
monopolist Gazprom, whose major shareholder is the Russian government with 38.7 
percent.282 Gazprom is also a major player in the oil sector, which is represented by 
several other companies, including Russia’s LUKoil and Yukos companies. These three 
companies have formed a consortium that is jointly developing oil reserves in the Russian 
part of the Caspian.283 Importantly, the management of oil pipelines is done through 
another state-controlled company, Transneft, whose pipelines serve as the main export 
route for Caspian oil.284 Until the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
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that bypasses Russia, the main export route for the Azerbaijani oil was the Baku-
Novorossiysk pipeline, which went through Russia. The amount of oil exported through 
that pipeline accounted for only one percent of Russia’s overall oil exports,285 but 
maintaining its monopoly over energy flow gave Moscow a dominant bargaining position 
over Baku and a potential lever for political influence. 
Russian oil giant LUKoil initially acquired a small share in a major Caspian oil 
consortium, the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC).286  Later in 2002, 
it pulled out of Azerbaijan, causing a lot of speculation.287 According to some analysts, 
LUKoil’s withdrawal was “related to the company’s broader strategic retrenchment and 
debt consolidation,” rather than traditional geopolitics.288 Recently, it has been reported 
that LUKoil has failed to find “commercially viable hydrocarbon reserves” at the Yalama 
block in Azerbaijan, where it remained invested after the pullout from AIOC.289 
Interestingly, LUKoil still remains an investor in the Shah Deniz offshore gas field in 
Azerbaijan, which is scheduled to deliver six to seven billion cubic meters of gas to 
Turkey in late 2006 through the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline, currently under 
construction.290  
Russia tries to play a major role in Caspian oil production and transportation for 
apparent economic and political reasons. Initially, the Russian leadership insisted that the 
legal status of the Caspian Sea had to be determined before its energy resources could be 
used.291 This obstructionist strategy, however, did not prevent but rather encouraged the 
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Caspian states to seek foreign support to push their oil production and transportation 
through third-country routes—bypassing Russia.292  
Under Putin’s leadership, Russia’s Caspian energy policy has become more 
consistent and pragmatic.293 Putin aimed at achieving better coordination of Moscow’s 
oil diplomacy, which from the mid 1990s was trapped between the state policy crafted in 
terms of East-West geopolitical competition and major corporate interests.294 Moscow 
took practical steps to dissipate the controversy with Azerbaijan over the division of 
Caspian energy reserves, and eventually consented to the construction of the BTC 
pipeline.295 In 2003, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia concluded a trilateral maritime 
border agreement based on a “Modified Median Line.”296 It has been suggested that this 
change in Moscow’s policy was motivated by Russia’s desire to participate in the 
development of the huge Kashagan oilfield in Kazakhstan’s sector of the Caspian, as well 
as the “need to establish property rights on the newly discovered oilfield” in Russia’s part 
of the Sea.297  
The relative inactivity of the oil sector in the Transcaucasus is offset by the 
expansionist policies of RAO UES and Gazprom. The Southern Caucasian states face a 
“serious dilemma”: they were forced to privatize state-owned energy facilities in order to 
achieve decent maintenance and effective governance.298  Due to uncertainty, Western 
companies are reluctant to invest in these enterprises. In contrast, Russian energy 
monopolists “associated with the government are capitalizing on high prices of energy” 
and using their revenues to invest in key strategic sectors.299 
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In 2003, UES acquired 75 percent of the shares in the electricity distribution 
company Telasi from an American investor AES, which had suffered financial losses. 
This gave Russia control over Georgia’s main power plants and Tbilisi’s power grid.300 
Some analysts saw this move as a “surrender of Georgia’s energy system to UES.”301 
The UES has recently expressed its desire to buy five hydropower stations in western 
Georgia and the largest hydropower plant on the administrative border with the 
breakaway region Abkhazia.302 Although Georgia has significant electricity generation 
resources, because of poor distribution networks, huge amounts of electricity are lost in 
transmission. Georgia relies on supplementary imports from Armenia and Russia, but can 
also receive supplies from Azerbaijan and Turkey.303   
UES also holds a major share in the Armenian electricity sector. In 2001, 
Armenia signed a ten-year plan of economic cooperation with Russia intended to achieve 
greater integration of the two economies and to attract Russian investment into Armenian 
economy, thus boosting its industrial growth.304 As an appendix to the economic 
cooperation plan, Armenia suggested a debt-for-equities scheme intended to clear 
Yerevan’s $100 million debt to Moscow. In 2002, the debt-for-equity deal was signed 
and the UES acquired four units of the Hrazdan power plant, which accounted for 20 
percent of Armenia’s annual electricity production.305 Four other largely moribund 
enterprises of the military-industrial complex were also handed to Russia as a part of that 
swap agreement.306 President Kocharian denied media speculation that the deal was part 
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of the Kremlin’s drive to make Yerevan more dependent on Russia. He stated, “This 
proposal was made by ourselves. Nobody is trying to foist anything upon us.”307 Analysts 
agree that the swap relieved Yerevan of a “significant and growing part of its foreign debt 
service” and left “Russia in the position of strategic investor,” but they also noted that the 
agreement gave Russia significant long-term political benefits.308 
 Even before the swap deal, the Armenian energy sector was dependent on 
Russian nuclear fuel for its Metsamor nuclear power plant, which accounts for nearly 40 
percent of Armenia’s annual electricity production.309 The plant ran up $32 million in 
debt to Russian suppliers and was unable to purchase nuclear fuel deliveries until it was 
placed under the five-year financial management of UES in 2003. RAO UES was also 
granted ownership of a cascade of six hydroelectric plants near Yerevan.310 The chief 
executive of the nuclear plant, Gagik Markosian, recently maintained that “the plant has 
balanced its books and experienced no refueling difficulties for the first time since the 
1995 reactivation.”311 The move, however, placed 80 percent of Armenia’s electrical 
generating capacity under the control of UES.312 Moreover, in 2005 the subsidiary of 
UES, Interenergo BV, purchased Electricity Networks of Armenia (ENA) from the 
British-registered Midland Resources Holding, which had privatized the electricity 
distribution network in 2002.313 UES had for years unsuccessfully tried to gain control 
over the country’s electricity grid and had been defeated in international bidding. Now, 
with this last purchase, the Armenian electricity sector fell under near-complete control 
of Russians. It is important to note that Armenia is an energy exporter; integration of its  
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electricity system with that of Georgia and Azerbaijan would allow UES to effectively 
control the regional electricity flow and to penetrate “the power market in Iran and 
Turkey.”314 
In 2004, UES signed a memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan, pledging 
greater investment and “expanding cooperation to penetrate the Iranian market.”315 So 
far, UES has not acquired major enterprises in Azerbaijan, but has obtained Baku’s 
agreement for the “parallel operation” of Russian and Azerbaijani electricity systems.316 
It has signed contracts that allow transmission of electricity from Azerbaijan to Turkey 
and Iran. Analysts suggest that Azerbaijan’s oil and gas-related revenues give it a better 
bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia, allowing it to avoid debt-for-equities swaps and the 
sale of energy facilities that would be impossible to maintain otherwise.317 Indeed, as 
Henry Hale notes, the “logic of economics” drives energy-rich states away from 
Russia.318 
Azerbaijan generates sufficient amounts of electricity to meet its domestic 
consumption. However, significant amounts are lost in transmission because of the poor 
distribution network. Azerbaijan, therefore, relies on supplementary imports, which come 
mainly from Russia and Turkey.319 It is expected that Azerbaijan’s demand for electricity 
(and thus its dependence on Russian supplies) will increase slightly when the BTC 
pipeline starts working.320 Azerbaijan is also dependent on Russian natural gas imports, 
despite the large Shah Deniz gas field. The volume of gas imports have increased 
significantly since 2001, because oil-fired power plants have been changed to gas-fired 
ones.321 U.S. Department of Energy analysts, however, note that Azerbaijan’s 
dependency on gas imports will decrease as its production increases from domestic 
offshore gas fields like Shah Deniz. Given its oil and gas resources and non-Russian 
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export routes, Azerbaijan, in Ilham Aliev’s words, can “reliably ensure its energy 
security.”322 The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline, scheduled to become operational in 
autumn 2006, will serve as a major export route for Azerbaijan’s gas surplus and will 
help Georgia to diversify its gas supplies, thus reducing Georgia’s dependence on 
Russian gas imports.  
 
Table 2. Energy Statistics of the Transcaucasus Region, 2003 (From: Energy 
Information Administration, US Department of Energy. Available from: 









Armenia 0.0 0.0 41.6 
Azerbaijan 0.7-1.3 328.0 114.0 
Georgia 0.3 2.1 40.1 
Natural Gas 
 Reserves (tcf) Production (bcf) Consumption (bcf) 
Armenia 0.0 0.0 46.6 
Azerbaijan 30.0 180.0 330.0 
Georgia 0.3 0.6 35.3 
Electricity 
 Capacity (GW) Generation (Bill. kwh) Consumption (Bill. kwh) 
Armenia 2.6 6.5 5.8 
Azerbaijan 5.2 17.6 17.4 
Georgia 4.4 6.7 6.8 
 
The expansion of UES into Armenia and Georgia is not an isolated phenomenon; 
it is paralleled by the penetration of their gas markets by Russia’s gas monopolist 
Gazprom.323 In 1997, in a debt-for-equity swap, Gazprom obtained a 55 percent 
controlling stake in Armenia’s entire gas infrastructure and formed ArmRosGazprom 
joint venture with its U.S.-registered Itera subsidiary. Gazprom is also Armenia’s 
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exclusive supplier of the gas, which generates nearly 40 percent of Armenia’s electricity 
and is increasingly used for heating households.324 In 2002, Tbilisi agreed to sell 51 
percent of the Tbilisi gas distribution company Tbilgazi and the chemical factory Azoti to 
the Gazprom’s subsidiary Itera.325  
In May 2003, Gazprom signed a 25-year “strategic partnership agreement” with 
the government of Georgia, which permitted “use of the Georgian infrastructure for 
transit purposes” and foresaw creation of joint ventures in Georgia’s energy system.326 
Analysts suggested that Gazprom has secured a right “to conclude confidential future 
projects with the Georgian government, possibly paving the way for debt-for-equity 
deals.”327 Gazprom is also Georgia’s single gas supplier. Recently, Gazprom has 
expressed its desire to buy the trunk pipeline that brings gas to Georgia and Armenia, but 
Tbilisi has not yet decided on the issue.328  
Acquisition of energy enterprises under the debt-for-equity deals in Georgia and 
Armenia seem disadvantageous for Russia, because most of the facilities are in disrepair 
and require large investments. However, it is beyond doubt that control over these 
facilities gives Moscow potential leverage over political developments in South 
Caucasus.  As Mamuka Tsereteli writes, 
This is not only a perceived, but a real threat. The Russian government has 
a recorded history of using energy dependence as a tool for political 
pressure. That was the case in the Baltics, when Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops in 1992. That was 
the case in Ukraine, where pressure was used for economic reasons. That 
was the case in Georgia in 2000-2001, when Moscow demanded support 
for the war in Chechnya and adjustments in Georgia’s western-oriented 
foreign policy.329 
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More recently, Russia announced that it is doubling the price of gas for the 
Transcaucasian countries starting in January 2006. The Georgian authorities responded 
by claiming that Russia’s decision to increase gas price was politically motivated. In an 
article in the Washington Post, Saakashvili wrote that “manipulation of energy prices and 
supplies is a critical tool of those in Russia who believe that hydrocarbons are the best 
means of political influence.”330 Saakashvili also announced that the decision to double 
the price of gas during the winter season, when supplies are critically needed, was 
calculated to provoke unrest and the overthrow of the government in Georgia.331 
Russian-Georgian relations deteriorated even more after a series of explosions in Russia’s 
North Ossetia and Karachaevo-Cherkessia that cut gas supplies to Georgia and Armenia 
and the delivery of electricity from Russia to Georgia.332 Saakashvili immediately 
accused Moscow of blackmailing Georgia over the trunk gas pipeline, calling Russia “an 
unprincipled blackmailer.”333  
The decision to increase gas prices also fueled anti-Russian sentiment in Armenia, 
where authorities spoke of the need to reconsider aspects of Russian-Armenian energy 
cooperation. Armenia’s Foreign Minister Oskanian announced that the move was 
“politically motivated and could damage close ties binding the two nations.”334 The 
Chairman of Armenia’s National Assembly, Artur Baghdasaryan, went so far as to 
suggest that Yerevan should consider demanding financial compensation for the presence 
of Russian troops in Armenia.335 Interestingly, Gazprom announced that Armenia will be 
charged the same price as other Southern Caucasian states if Armenia does not agree to 
give the UES control over a major thermal power plant in Hrazdan and the right to use 
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the gas pipeline that is projected to bring Iranian gas to Armenia in 2007.336 The 
Armenian leadership, however, firmly rejected the idea of giving additional assets to 
Russians. The negotiations have so far yielded no results, except that Russia has agreed to 
delay the price hike until April of 2006.337  
Russia is thought “to be uneasy about the project” of Iranian gas pipeline.338 
There were speculations in the media about possibility for the pipeline to be linked in the 
future with Ukraine and the European network via Georgia. The reports suggested that 
Moscow was strongly opposed to the idea, seeing it as a threat to its geo-economic 
policies.339 It is believed that Russia insisted that the future pipeline have a small 
diameter to prevent Iranian gas from exporting to third countries.340  
 
 
Figure 1.   Existing and Projected Pipelines in the Transcaucasus (From: US Department 
of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Russia Energy Survey, 2002. 
Available from: http://eia.doe.gov/ (accessed 15 December 2005) 
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Access to Iranian gas will ease Armenia’s dependence on Russia for energy 
resources and will significantly increase Armenia’s energy security. The pipeline would 
also allow Armenia to import Turkmen gas through Iran.341 Experts believe that 
Armenian-Iranian gas pipeline would sever one of the most important ties between 
Armenia and Russia.342  
Armenian leadership has been wary, lest its energy cooperation with Iran places 
them at odds with Washington, which views Iran as a state harboring terrorists and an 
“enemy of freedom, justice, and peace.”343 Importantly, the U.S. officials have “indicated 
that Washington does not object to the Armenian-Iranian energy projects, because they 
do not violate U.S. sanctions against Tehran.”344 Recently, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Armenia, John Evans, stated that “[t]he United States is very sympathetic to Armenia’s 
energy situation and to Armenia’s efforts to diversify sources of energy.”345 
How do the interests of the United States interact with Russia’s policies in the 
region? What are those interests and how are they linked with strategic environment of 
regional countries? Following chapter attempts to answer these questions. It starts with 
examination of U.S. interests and evolution of U.S. policy towards the South Caucasus. It 
also attempts to shed a light on areas of geopolitical cooperation and competition 
between Russia and the United States. 
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IV. U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 left a daunting power 
vacuum in the Southern Tier. Initially, the U.S. had no proactive policy towards the 
region. American strategists felt that with its global responsibilities, the U.S. had limited 
resources to “suggest an American or any other Western presence” to fill the security 
vacuum.346 Some analysts argued that developments in the Transcaucasus are largely 
marginal to U.S. interests and called for adopting a cautious policy line to prevent U.S. 
involvement in a “region beset by ethnic and civil conflicts.”347 As one analyst notes, 
“not being present historically and geographically, the United States does not share those 
same risks, the consequences of which could be paid for by the countries of the region 
and even Europe.”348  
According to Hunter, in the early 1990s, the Southern Caucasian countries held 
almost no intrinsic value for the United States; instead, what most mattered for the U.S. 
was the impact of regional developments on Russia, Turkey, and the Middle East.349 The 
U.S. at the time chose to respect the Russian notion of the Transcaucasus falling within 
Russia’s sphere of influence. It preferred Russian domination of the region (with modest 
U.S. interests) over an unpredictable and volatile situation loaded with the risk of 
confrontation between ambitious regional players.350 U.S. policy towards the region, 
however, has changed considerably over time, becoming more pronounced and activist, 
while still remaining “uncoordinated and often contradictory.”351 The evolution of U.S. 
policy towards the Transcaucasus has gone through three major phases: the period of 
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deference to Russia’s regional dominance from 1991-1994, cautious activism in 1994-
1999, and the current period of strategic engagement in the region.352  
A. EVOLUTION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOUTH 
CAUCASUS 
1. 1991-1994 
U.S. policy towards the Transcaucasus during this period was “Russo-centric and 
Russia-first in character,” which meant, given preoccupation with Russia’s future and 
support for Yeltsin’s regime, refraining from criticism of Moscow’s regional policies lest 
such criticism weaken Yeltsin’s authority.353 The main U.S. concern at the time was to 
encourage Russia’s transition to democracy and a market economy, as well as to achieve 
denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in line with the horizontal non-
proliferation policy promoted by Washington.354 Not surprisingly, one analyst has 
described American policy of the time as “Russia plus branch offices.”355  
The United States, however, established some “basic working guidelines,” which 
included recognizing the Soviet successor states as independent entities, facilitating their 
democratic transition and integration into international organizations, as well as 
supporting the development of market economies and cooperative regional 
arrangements.356 The U.S. was also interested in containing the Iranian influence in the 
Transcaucasus and preventing regional states from gravitating into its orbit.357 Another 
important component of U.S. policy was gaining access to energy resources of 
Azerbaijan and supporting export routes that would not cross Russian or Iranian 
territory.358 Beyond these “modest policy objectives,” however, the U.S. did not have 
active interests and a clearly defined policy towards the Transcaucasus.359 
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By the end of 1991, the U.S. had recognized the independence of all the Soviet 
successor states, including the Southern Caucasian countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia.360 The U.S. pursued close relations with Armenia, partly due to the country’s 
democratic progress, but also because of the influence of the Armenian-American lobby, 
whose activities focused mainly on the U.S. Congress.361 Levon Ter-Petrosian, elected 
Armenia’s President in October 1991, paid his first visit to the U.S. to “communicate his 
pro-Western policies in an obvious gesture of breaking with Moscow.”362 This “assertive 
foreign policy by a country far down the totem pole presented a puzzlement to the Bush 
Administration” and the symbolism of the meeting aside, it “did not go far in bolstering 
Armenia.”363 At the time, Georgia’s Gamsakhurdia had led his country into international 
isolation and internal conflict, and apparatchik Mutalibov still remained in power in 
Azerbaijan.364 The U.S., however, pursued closer ties with Tbilisi once Shevardnadze—a 
pro-Western Soviet foreign minister during the late 1990s—came to power in Georgia in 
early 1992.365 
In this period, the United States promoted Turkey as the principal regional power 
and a “model of economic and political development” for the regional countries, 
supporting Turkish attempts at reordering the Transcaucasus.366 Because the U.S. was 
unwilling to commit its resources and to provide security assistance to the regional 
countries, it chose to advance the role of Turkey as its “proxy security guarantor.”367  
United States policy was driven by fear of Islamic radicalism and by animosity toward 
Iran, whose influence in the power vacuum of the Southern Tier, in view of American 
strategists, could be balanced by Turkey’s strong role.368 As noted above, “excessive 
aggrandizement of the Turkish role” in the region was seen as a major security threat in 
                                                 
360 Nichol, CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 1. 
361 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 368. 
362 Adalian, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy,” 322. 
363 Ibid. 
364 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, 368. 
365 Nichol, CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 2. 
366 Hunter, The Transcaucasus in Transition, 159. 
367 Adalian, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy,” 321. 
368 Masih and Krikorian, Armenia: At the Crossroads, 110. 
60 
the neighboring country of Armenia.369 As Adalian remarks, this “policy only 
highlighted Armenia’s potential isolation and encirclement at a time when it already 
faced serious complications with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.”370  
Turkey, which was “expected to play the role of moderate power, in a word, 
hijacked Western policy toward Armenia,” aligning with Azerbaijan in early 1992 and 
“compounding the severity of the crisis in the region.”371 In February 1992, huge anti-
Armenian demonstrations were held in Turkey, with hundreds of thousands of Turks 
calling for intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan.372 At the time the Turkish President 
Turgut Özal went so far as to openly threaten Armenia, announcing on several occasions 
that Armenians “should be frightened a little.”373 The Turko-centrism of U.S. policy, 
which was not “so fine tuned as to factor in every nuance arising from the specific 
[regional] conditions,” appeared to validate “what the Russians had always found 
convenient to reinforce: Armenian insecurity about Turkey’s ambitions and the potential 
consequences these presented in light of their past experience.”374 As Adalian writes, the 
result was that “Armenia, a pro-Western democracy, was slowly alienated from the West 
by the presumed defender of Western interests in the region” and began to seek Russia as 
a guarantor of its security and a balancing force against Turkey.375 Unfortunately, U.S. 
efforts to make Turkey change its unfriendly policies towards Armenia were ineffective 
and have remained largely fruitless.376  
It should be noted that because of incompatible Russian and Turkish ambitions in 
the region, the Turko-centric policy was in contradiction with Russo-centrism of 
American strategists. The U.S. policymakers soon realized that with Turkey trying to take 
advantage of Russia’s temporary withdrawal, the volatile situation posed risks of Russo-
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Turkish confrontation at exactly the time when the U.S. was actively supporting Yeltsin’s 
pro-Western regime to “prevent the country from slipping into aggressive 
authoritarianism and xenophobia.”377 Such concerns, coupled with animosity toward Iran 
and “exaggerated fear” of Islamic radicalism, drove U.S. policymakers to see the return 
of Russian domination as the “least of several evils.”378  
At the same time, containing interethnic conflicts or helping with democratization 
in the region became lesser priorities for the U.S.379 For instance, the United States did 
little to help Shevardnadze in his struggle against Moscow and it did not warn Russia 
against intervening in Georgia’s civil war. Similarly, Russia’s reestablishment of its 
influence in Azerbaijan and ousting of pro-Turkish nationalist President Elchibey were 
accepted in the U.S. as fait accompli.380 By the end of 1993, however, Russia’s policy of 
aggressive reintegration led some policymakers in the U.S. to gradually reconsider the 
Russo-centric policy and favor a greater focus on individual states. However, as Hunter 
notes, the shift was not pronounced and it did not “dramatically affect the course of 
events” in the region.381 
During this period, foreign policy interest groups, notably the Armenian-
American community, played an important role in focusing U.S. attention on the 
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict.382 In 1992, the conflict had already escalated into a 
full-scale war by Azerbaijan against the majority Armenian population of the Nagorno-
Karabakh autonomous oblast (NKAO), who had initiated a process of independence, held 
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a referendum consistent with existing Soviet laws and procedures, and, in December 
1991, obtained an overwhelming mandate for independence.383 As Nichol writes,  
Congressional concerns about the NK conflict led to the inclusion of 
Section 907 in the FREEDOM [Freedom for Russia and Emerging 
Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets] Support Act, which prohibits 
U.S. government-to-government assistance to Azerbaijan, except for non-
proliferation and disarmament activities, until the President determines 
that Azerbaijan has taken “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and 
other offensive uses of force against Armenia and NK.”384 
According to Shaffer, Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act became “a major 
constraint on U.S. policy options towards the region.”385 Importantly, it also limited U.S. 
security cooperation with Armenia, because of U.S. policy of parity in military transfers 
and security ties with Armenia and Azerbaijan.386 U.S. policy towards Azerbaijan, 
however, soon changed towards greater cooperative engagement—initially led by the 
interests of major American oil companies.  
2. 1994-1999 
As Cornell writes, during the second half of the 1990s, private American interests, 
which in many respects matched those of Baku, started to “make a difference in 
Washington.” 387 In 1994, Heidar Aliev started re-negotiating the former government’s 
oil deals, which had collapsed after the ousting of President Elchibey.388 Cornell says,  
Aliyev’s consistent policy . . . [was] to try to attract as many foreign 
powers as possible into the politics of oil, thereby bringing about a vested 
interest in these countries in supporting Aliyev’s regime—and, by 
extension, displaying a more positive attitude toward Azerbaijan and its 
position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.389  
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In September 1994, an eight billion dollar contract, the “deal of the century,” was 
signed with a consortium of Western companies.390 The agreement established the AIOC, 
in which 40 percent of the shares were held by American oil companies.391 With the deal 
signed, the “Texas Oil interests” began using their lobbying mechanisms in Washington 
to influence U.S. policy “to further Azerbaijan’s interests, and thereby their own 
interests” in the Transcaucasus.392 The oil lobby came to counterbalance Armenian-
American influence in the Congress, because the oil lobby’s support of Azerbaijani 
attempts at removing or easing Section 907 could make American oil companies eligible 
for U.S. government’s financial assistance. Shaffer writes, “in this period one witnessed a 
plethora of congressional testimonies and major public statements” that emphasized the 
importance of Caspian energy resources and the need for rapprochement with Azerbaijan, 
a country increasingly viewed as a major producer and a transit route for the East-West 
energy corridor.393 Although Congress did not remove the Section 907 prohibition, 
legislative provisions for fiscal years 1996, 1998 and 1999 eased the prohibition by 
allowing for “humanitarian, democratization, and business aid exemptions.”394 
In this period, Washington intensified its efforts at promoting U.S. economic and 
strategic interests in the Transcaucasus, “following the lead given by major U.S. 
corporations.”395 The Transcaucasus and Central Asia were declared “a strategic vital 
region” where the developments “matter[ed] profoundly to the U.S.”396 Caspian energy 
development, which was consistent with U.S. energy policy of lessening dependence on 
Persian Gulf oil, became an increasing concern of the Clinton administration.397 The 
extensive U.S. interest in Caspian energy resources was expressly stated in National 
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Security Strategy Reports prepared by the Clinton administration in 1997 and 1998.398 
Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador at large and Special Advisor to Secretary of State for 
the Newly Independent States, officially announced that “energy development and the 
creation of an East-West energy transport corridor” were among important U.S. foreign 
policy goals in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.399 At the same time, the 
administration started promoting the BTC pipeline as part of that energy corridor.400 In 
1998, a position of Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian 
Basin Energy Diplomacy was introduced, and in 1999 political and economic support 
was obtained for construction of BTC pipeline.401 
It is important to note that in the last decade the consumption of oil in the U.S. has 
almost doubled, making the country more dependent on oil-exporting small states of the 
Persian Gulf, Africa and South America. The United States has complicated relations 
with many of these states, and a secure supply is often threatened by regional instability 
and petro-terrorism, which often cause oil shortages and, therefore, its price hikes. The 
United States, a global superpower with unmatched military strength and economic and 
political influence, is sensitive to oil price rises, which can have internal political and 
economic implications.402 Therefore, from a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, it is 
logical to expect that the U.S. would pursue Caspian energy resources to diversify its 
supplies and to mitigate effects of possible external changes. 
As Oliker notes, “the United States itself is unlikely to become a customer for the 
Caspian oil or gas.”403 According to Shaffer, the U.S. views Azerbaijani oil “as a 
contributor to global oil supply diversification” and “as oil in the margins,” a tool to 
affect world oil prices.404 However, this is not to suggest that oil interests were the main 
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factor behind the U.S. administration’s adoption of a more assertive policy towards the 
region and its rapprochement with Azerbaijan. American economic interests and the role 
of the oil factor have often been overestimated by many analysts.405 Moreover, despite 
much speculation regarding Azerbaijan’s “huge” oil reserves, it appears that much of the 
oil is concentrated in the northeastern part of the Caspian Sea.406 In its official rhetoric, 
however, the U.S. has long insisted on high-end estimates of Azerbaijani and Caspian oil 
reserves, arguably using the oil issue as a reason for activist involvement in the region.407  
As Blank notes, Washington’s interests in the regional economy do not take 
precedence over America’s larger geo-strategic goals.408 The Transcaucasus, due to its 
location, is viewed by American strategists as a strategically important region that can 
serve as a gateway to the Central Asian states of the Caspian basin. In the context of 
larger U.S. policy, supporting westward pipelines that bypass Iran and Russia is an 
important prerequisite for strengthening the independence of Central Asian and 
Transcaucasian small states, a step toward creating “the cooperative Eurasia that would 
be the base for future world politics.”409 This approach has also been reflected in 
statements by U.S. officials. In April 1998, Stephen Sestanovich stated, 
We cannot and should not look at Caspian energy policy in isolation from 
our overall goals for the region. Our promotion of an economically viable 
East-West Eurasian transport corridor to bring Caspian energy resources 
to international markets is part of a larger strategy that supports peace and 
stability, democracy and respect for human rights, market economic 
reform and development, openness toward the United States and to U.S. 
business, and the region’s integration into Euro-Atlantic and global 
institutions.410  
Congruent with its general regional policy, Washington also tried to improve its 
political and security cooperation with Southern Caucasian countries. In 1996, the U.S. 
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welcomed the establishment of pro-Western GUAM grouping.411 In 1997, the U.S. 
activated its efforts at facilitating the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
becoming a co-chair, along with France and Russia, of the OSCE Minsk Group.412 On a 
number of occasions Washington also openly condemned Russia’s “heavy-handed 
treatment of Georgia.”413 Although conflict resolution efforts remained limited and 
unsuccessful, they are a significant departure from the previous policy of deference to 
Russian regional hegemony. 
3. Current U.S. Policy 
The Bush Administration gave new vigor to America’s regional diplomacy, 
hosting intensive talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute in early 2001, in Key West, 
Florida. The sides were indeed close to reaching a peace agreement, but Aliev’s 
concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh’s status produced strong opposition among the 
Azerbaijani elite and the peace settlement once again went into a deadlock.414 However, 
with such “high-level U.S. commitment” to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations, 
Washington signaled the start of an even more activist policy towards the 
Transcaucasus.415  Although the U.S. continued its policy of helping the Southern 
Caucasian states to minimize their dependency on Moscow, it remained “wary of 
unequivocally placing itself in opposition to Russia in the region.”416 As Shaffer writes, 
in this period, Washington has tended to work cooperatively with Moscow, and “this has 
had a very positive impact on their ability to cooperate in policies and conflict resolution 
efforts in the South Caucasus.”417  
Since September 11, 2001, U.S. policy towards the region has changed 
dramatically, because the Caspian basin and the Transcaucasus have acquired paramount 
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importance in strategic and security terms. Indeed, the terrorist attacks demonstrated that 
geographically distant regions, where the U.S. interests were thought in terms of “nice-to-
haves,” could have a profound impact on U.S. immediate interests.418 For instance, if the 
Transcaucasus became a terrorist haven, it would pose immediate security threats, and 
would render exploitation of Caspian energy resources impossible, thus jeopardizing 
America’s larger geo-strategic interests in the region.419 It is therefore not surprising that 
American strategists now view U.S. regional policy as an important element of the 
Global War on Terrorism and they link the South Caucasus with Central Asia in an 
integrated security complex.420 As General James Jones, head of U.S. European 
Command (EUCOM), stated in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 
March 2005, 
[T]he Caucasus is increasingly important to our interests. Its air corridor 
has become a crucial lifeline between coalition forces in Afghanistan and 
our bases in Europe. Caspian oil carried through the Caucasus, may 
constitute as much as 25 percent of the world’s growth in oil production 
over the next five years . . . This region is a geographical pivot point in the 
spread of democracy and free market economies to the states of Central 
and Southwest Asia.421 
For the United States, Russia is at the core of the integrated regional security 
complex. Importantly, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Moscow emerged early as one 
of Washington’s “staunchest” partners in the fight against terrorism.422 Ignoring the 
opposition of his closest military advisors and the Russian political elite, President Putin 
offered immediate assistance to the United States.423 As Goldman writes, Putin’s 
acquiescence to the stationing of U.S. and NATO troops in Central Asian former Soviet 
republics was a dramatic reversal of Moscow’s previous policy of resisting U.S. influence 
in the region.424 Interestingly, the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy Report stated that 
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[R]ecent developments have encouraged our hope that a truly global 
consensus about basic principles is slowly taking shape. With Russia, we 
are already building a new strategic relationship based on a central reality 
of the twenty-first century: the United States and Russia are no longer 
strategic adversaries . . . At the same time, we are realistic about the 
differences that still divide us from Russia and about the time and effort it 
will take to build an enduring strategic partnership.425 
Analysts have argued that Moscow’s policy shift was motivated by the need to 
realize Russia’s objectives in foreign and domestic affairs.426 They argue that sustaining 
cooperation between Washington and Moscow will largely “depend on the extent to 
which they continue to perceive their interests as shared.”427 Recently, Russian officials 
have called for establishing deadlines for the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from 
Central Asia.428 Additionally, U.S. and Russian interests have clashed over a number of 
issues, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, strategic arms reductions, the 
U.S.-led war in Iraq, and Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran.429 However, analysts 
note that despite such tensions, Washington and Moscow seem “determined to preserve 
the cooperative relationship they built following the September 11 attacks.”430 As the 
Commission on America’s National Interests and Russia writes,   
The combination of Russia’s size and strategic location; its relationships 
with, intelligence about and access to key countries; its arsenal of nuclear 
and other weapons and technologies; its enormous energy resources; and 
its ability to facilitate or block action by the United Nations Security 
Council places Moscow among America’s most important potential 
partners. Fortunately, the interests America and Russia share greatly 
outweigh the interests that divide . . . [them].431 
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According to Zagorski, the dialogue established between the U.S. and Russia 
“ensures that tensions can be attenuated on the basis of compromise.”432 Washington and 
Moscow cooperate in the region through “the Caucasus and Central Asia subgroup of the 
U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism.”433 Moreover, it is well known that the 
U.S. and Russian governments today belong to multiple international regimes and are 
connected through several “vital strategic interests.”434 From the neoliberal perspective, 
“linking clusters of issues to one another” within the regimes, and the regimes themselves 
in the networks, induces cooperation and facilitates intergovernmental agreements.435 As 
Keohane writes, regimes enforce principles of reciprocity, reduce uncertainty and 
discourage pursuit of myopic self-interest because of the prospects of retaliatory 
linkages.436 Importantly, US strategists note that “failure to seek areas of compromise 
with Russia . . . [on regional policies] will make it more difficult for the United States to 
pursue and attain its goals in the region.”437  
According to Blank, the “U.S. and NATO partnerships with Russia offer an 
enormous opportunity to shape and transform the security environment throughout the 
former Soviet Union.”438 Most important, the unprecedented cooperation between 
Washington and Moscow in the fight against terrorism and, in the words of the U.S. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “probably the best [U.S.-Russian bilateral] relations 
in a long time,”439 provide new opportunities for small states that benefit from 
convergence rather than conflict of great power interests in the region. As Perovic writes, 
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“[t]he fate of the South Caucasus . . . is, in important ways, bound to the dynamics of 
relations” between Russia and the United States.440 Analysts believe that coordinated 
policies of Washington and Moscow can lead to a greater stability, development, and 
conflict resolution in the region—a “Great Gain”441 scenario instead of a confrontational 
“new Great Game.”442 Importantly, U.S.-Russian effective cooperation will depend on 
Russia’s respect of “the values of freedom and democracy at home” and their non-
hindrance in the regions of vital interest to the United States: “the broader Middle East, 
South and Central Asia, and East Asia.”443 
The U.S. has a number of peripheral interests in the Transcaucasus, but security, 
human rights, and economic interests dominate the current U.S. agenda towards the 
Transcaucasus. 
B. SECURITY INTERESTS 
1. Counterterrorism Efforts and Law Enforcement Assistance 
In its security policies towards the Transcaucasus, the U.S. is interested in 
enhancing the security of regional states and addressing “threats that are of concern to the 
United States.”444 As Oliker writes, if prior to 9/11 “there existed the possibility that the 
interests of allies, such as Turkey, would lead to greater U.S. involvement in the region    
. . . now the United States has its own imperatives to remain involved.”445 Washington’s 
security interests in the Transcaucasus have dramatically increased because the region 
has come to be viewed “as the lynchpin of any U.S. role in Central Asia.”446 Analysts 
maintain that the Transcaucasus and Central Asia have become integral parts of U.S. war 
on terrorism.447 Importantly, the growing U.S. interest in the Transcaucasus and 
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improved security cooperation with regional countries both help these states to diversify 
their security policies, lessening their dependence on Russia.448 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the three Southern Caucasian states were 
quick to grant the Pentagon fly-over rights and to offer their support for the Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.449 Azerbaijan’s strategic position acquired 
renewed importance for Washington. Good relations with Baku would help the U.S. to 
effectively project its power into Afghanistan and the Middle East. Caspian energy 
resources once again inspired intense attention from U.S. strategists as they renewed their 
search for non-OPEC energy resources to diversify global oil supply and lower oil 
prices.450 The importance of Azerbaijan also grew because of “the perceived need to 
strengthen [U.S.] ties with [secular, pro-Western] Muslim-majority states,” whose 
participation in anti-terrorist efforts would “add legitimacy” to those missions.451 The 
anti-terrorist rhetoric of Baku further strengthened Aliyev’s position and helped to shift 
attitudes of the U.S. administration and the Congress.452 In January 2002, Section 907 
restrictions on US security assistance to Azerbaijan were waived by presidential 
authority.453  Since then, President Bush has exercised the waiver annually.454 
The U.S. helps Azerbaijan and Georgia confront Islamic radicals and terrorists 
who penetrate these countries’ territories.455 Moreover, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
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reportedly play a “key role” in narcotics and arms trafficking routes;456 therefore, U.S. 
security assistance programs are also targeted at enhancing their border control and law 
enforcement capabilities. It has been also reported that the United States has committed 
millions of dollars to facilitate the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia.457 
Following the lifting of Section 907 restrictions, the U.S. Department of Defense 
has embarked on large programs of security assistance to Azerbaijan. In March 2002, the 
first U.S.-Azerbaijan military consultations were held in Baku, centered on military 
training and naval defense in the Caspian.458 Since then, the U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM) has significantly broadened its initiatives in Azerbaijan. They currently 
include the “Caspian Guard program” and the “Caspian Hydrocarbons initiative,” which 
provide security assistance to Azerbaijan to help protect energy corridors and establish an 
“integrated airspace, maritime and border control regime” with Kazakhstan.459  
Other EUCOM initiatives in the Transcaucasus include the “South Caucasus 
Clearinghouse,” which aims to facilitate information sharing on security assistance 
programs among regional countries and the U.S., and the “Sustainment and Stability 
Operations Program” (SSOP) in Georgia.460  The goal of the SSOP, which was launched 
in 2005 as a follow-on to the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), is to improve 
readiness capabilities of four Georgian battalions, “in part to support U.S.-led coalition 
operations.”461 The GTEP was carried out from 2002 to 2004; it was aimed at helping 
Georgian military, security, and border troops combat terrorists who had infiltrated 
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Georgia from Afghanistan, Chechnya and Arab countries. The program was also intended 
to strengthen Georgia’s ability to ensure internal stability and protection of energy 
pipelines that traverse its territory.462  
As part of the GTEP, the U.S. deployed about 200 military trainers to instruct 
Georgian troops in “light infantry tactics.”463 The U.S. also provided those forces with 
small arms, communications equipment, ammunition and uniforms.464 Interestingly, 
Russia acquiesced to the deployment of military instructors, and Putin reportedly 
downplayed the move, remarking that it “is not a tragedy.”465 According to Trenin, this 
response reflects Putin’s “hard-headed analysis” of Moscow’s expectations, resources, 
and the threat of terrorism, which, “for the first time since 1945 . . . [had become] a 
common enemy” for the United States and Russia.466 
After lifting the prohibition on security assistance to Azerbaijan, Washington has 
also intensified its military cooperation with Armenia, which became eligible for Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET).467 
Security assistance programs in Armenia are aimed at improving stability in the country, 
promoting interoperability with NATO troops, providing professional military training, 
establishing peacekeeping capabilities, and modernizing military communications.468 In 
May 2004, Armenia received the first installment of a seven million dollar military 
communications contract from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).469 The U.S. 
government also provides funding for security improvements in Metsamor nuclear power 
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plant, joint research activities and mine clearing.470 Armenian Armed Forces also have a 
military cooperation program with the Kansas National Guard, as part of the Pentagon’s 
National Guard State Partnership Program.471 
It is important to note that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia play significant 
counter-terrorism roles by participating in multinational efforts to secure stability and 
peace in Iraq.472 Azerbaijan and Georgia dispatched their forces to Iraq in August 2003. 
In January 2005, Armenia deployed its personnel in Iraq, despite significant domestic 
opposition and concerns about the safety of thousands of Armenian-Iraqis.473 The 
supporters of the risky Iraq mission argued that Armenia’s involvement in the anti-
terrorist multinational force is “necessary for forging closer security links with the United 
States.”474 Security cooperation with Washington has broad political-military 
implications for Armenia; fostering closer defense cooperation with the U.S. is important 
to modernize and reform Armenia’s military, and to “complement” Armenian-Russian 
security alliance with US-Armenian military ties, thus strengthening Armenia’s 
security.475  
According to Lynch, U.S. policy since September 11 has also given priority to 
gaining basing rights in the Transcaucasus.476 In November 2004, General Charles Wald, 
deputy head of U.S. EUCOM, announced that the Pentagon was “exploring the possible 
establishment of cooperative security locations—sites without a full-time U.S. military 
presence that are used for refueling and short-duration deployments—in Azerbaijan or 
Georgia.”477 Recently, there have been numerous media reports and speculations about 
possible deployment of U.S. military bases in Georgia and Azerbaijan. These reports, 
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however, were rejected by top U.S. officials.478 Interestingly, both Azerbaijan and 
Georgia have repeatedly stated that they do not plan to have any foreign military bases on 
their soil.479 Analysts suggest that the leadership in both countries is careful not to 
provoke fears of Russia and Iran, their powerful neighbors. It remains unclear whether 
foreign bases will appear in the Transcaucasus anytime soon. 
2. NATO’s Regional Involvement 
Since its founding, NATO has been perceived as an “organic institution,” 
constantly adapting to changing requirements of the international environment.480  After 
the collapse of the Soviet camp the adaptation in some sense became synonymous with 
the Alliance’s enlargement, an initiative mainly led by the most powerful NATO 
member, the United States.481 As Thomas writes, many analysts thought that NATO, an 
organization established in response to the Cold War, would become an “anachronism 
that had to go.”482 The Alliance, however, managed to survive; it underwent dramatic 
changes, adapting to new challenges, and transformed itself to acquire out-of-area tasks 
and peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement missions.483 
The members of the Alliance were quick to embrace the notion that “European 
security was indivisible and that only through cooperation with non-NATO members 
would security and stability throughout the continent be ensured.”484 NATO thus  
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dedicated significant efforts to developing partnership relations with the former Soviet 
states and countries of East Europe. The Transcaucasus was recognized as a region of 
strategic importance for NATO.485  
Along with the U.S., several key NATO allies, including Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and to a lesser degree Italy, France and Norway, have developed large 
economic stakes in the Caspian; they accordingly share a common interest in developing 
the region’s oil resources and safeguarding energy corridors.486 In 1997, during his visit 
to Baku, Javier Solana, then NATO Secretary-General, emphasized the strategic 
significance of the region: 
The Caucasus is an important region for Europe which has enormous 
social and economic potential. Europe will not be completely secure if the 
countries of the Caucasus remain outside European security.487  
The Alliance’s involvement in the region, therefore, has been aimed at developing 
regional cooperation and enhancing the security of the three Southern Caucasian 
states.488 The primary vehicle for such cooperation has been the Partnership for Peace 
program (PfP), which was “led by American initiative.”489 The program was built on the 
format of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)490 and was designed to help 
prospective new members in “creating effective and adequate defense structures . . . to 
address new security threats, promote civilian control over the military and encourage 
defense planning and budgeting.”491 In 1994, all three Transcaucasian states joined the 
PfP and embraced the opportunities provided by the program.492  
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In 1999, Azerbaijan and Georgia joined the NATO Planning and Review Process 
(PARP) to advance interoperability and transparency between their forces and NATO 
troops.493 Armenia joined the PARP program in 2002, and, subsequently, significantly 
increased its engagement in the EAPC.494 In 2003, Armenia hosted the “Cooperative 
Best Effort,” the second PfP land-based military exercise in the Transcaucasus.495 It has 
been suggested that after the lifting of Section 907 restrictions increased U.S.-Azerbaijani 
military cooperation, Armenia was prompted to intensify its security dialogue with 
NATO in order to lessen polarization and competition in the region.496 Importantly, U.S.-
Russian expanding cooperation in the fight against terrorism, coupled with “forward 
movement in NATO-Russia relations,”497 helped Yerevan to complement Russian-
Armenian security ties with improved cooperation with EAPC partners, while at the same 
time avoiding the unpleasant situation of “taking sides.”498 Moreover, deepening U.S.-
Armenian military cooperation became instrumental in strengthening Armenia’s relations 
with NATO member-states.  
It is important to note that after regaining its independence, Armenia, a European 
country by default, has chosen a “European direction” of foreign policy—orienting itself 
towards Europe.499 Therefore, expanding cooperation with NATO, the key “source and 
guardian of a new pan-European security system,” is in line with Armenia’s general 
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foreign policy.500 As Armenia’s Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian noted, “neither 
invited nor self-invited to be a candidate for NATO membership, Armenia, through PfP, 
is active and interested in the process [of engagement with NATO].”501 
At the 2002 Prague summit, NATO launched the Individual Partnership Action 
Plan (IPAP) “designed specifically for each individual partner and intended to prioritize, 
harmonize and organize all aspects of the NATO-Partner relationship in the . . . EAPC 
and PfP framework.”502 In 2004, Georgia became the first country in the Transcaucasus 
to have an IPAP with NATO. The following year, North Atlantic Council approved 
IPAPs for Armenia and Azerbaijan.503  NATO spokesman James Appathurai hailed 
intensification of NATO-South Caucasus cooperation, stating that it “reflects the 2004 
Istanbul Summit decisions to place a special focus on the strategically important regions 
of the Caucasus and Central Asia.”504  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia participate in NATO-led peacekeeping 
operations in Kosovo. Georgia and Azerbaijan have also dispatched some forces to 
support coalition operations in Afghanistan.505 Both countries have stated that they want 
their countries to join NATO. Georgia’s Saakashvili has recently announced that his 
country is “very close . . . to becom[ing] a NATO member in 2008.”506 According to 
Nichol, however, “much greater progress in military reform” will likely be required 
before Georgia and Azerbaijan are considered for membership.507 As Sagramoso writes, 
“it remains unclear . . . whether or not NATO’s door will be open to them in the near 
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future, and whether or not NATO will be ready to protect them against a foreign [read 
Russian] attack or a major threat.”508 She notes that “NATO has tended to adopt vague 
commitments” towards Southern Caucasian countries.509 Although the Alliance has 
“regularly condemned the use of force in the region,” it has refrained from getting 
involved in conflict resolution efforts in the Transcaucasus.510 
Despite some ambivalence, better relations with NATO aimed at strengthening 
Russia’s institutional links within the Euro-Atlantic community are an important part of 
Russian President Putin’s policy. Recently, during a meeting of Russia’s Security 
Council, it was reiterated that “joint security initiatives with NATO correspond to 
Russia’s long term interests . . . [and] provide new opportunities to address national 
problems.”511 Relations with NATO are also important in creating a more predictable 
climate in Eurasia, although Russia still appears somewhat concerned about the prospects 
of NATO’s “geographic expansion.”512  
More recently, commenting on Georgia’s possible NATO membership, Sergey 
Ivanov, Russia’s Defense Minister, stated that Russia is not “dramatizing the situation, 
because stereotypes of the Cold War confrontation of [two opposing] blocs remain in the 
past, while Russia’s cooperation with NATO expands year after year.”513 He then 
emphasized that “although the advancement of a military bloc to our borders is not very 
pleasing, in light of this new thinking [it is] not fatal either.”514 Interestingly, this change 
in “thinking,” coupled with increasing Western influence in the region and a wave of 
velvet revolutions that swept through Russia’s neighborhood, have prompted analysts to 
suggest that “Russia acts as a status quo power that is no longer able to resist the rise of 
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change.”515 According to Baev, Moscow’s “policy is one of small steps aimed at 
increasing control and influence.”516 One might add that Russia’s economic expansion 
into strategic energy sectors of regional countries clearly manifests this approach.  
C. DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES AND HUMANITARIAN, ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
After the collapse of the Soviet camp, the U.S. launched assistance programs in 
the region aimed at facilitating democratic transition, growth of market economies, and 
development of private and social sectors.517  The cornerstone of such partnerships has 
been the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) account, created in 1992.518 Early in the 1990s, 
the U.S. also provided significant humanitarian assistance to the region’s countries from 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) funds.519 The U.S. also contributes to programs 
funded through the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.520  
Armenia and Georgia have been the largest per capita recipients of U.S. aid in the 
former Soviet Union, “indicating the high level of concern within the Administration and 
Congress.”521 As noted before, in the case of Armenia, this has a lot to do with the 
prominent role of the Armenian-American community and its influence on foreign policy 
formulation towards the South Caucasus. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that 
“U.S. investment is the highest in Azerbaijan’s energy sector” despite “rampant 
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Table 3. U.S. FY1992-FY2004 and FY2004 Budgeted Aid, FY2005 Estimated Aid, 
and the FY2006 Approved Aid (From: Jim Nichol, CRS Issue Brief for Congress: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 23 February 2006. 12) 
 

















Armenia 1,487.6 89.39 86.56 81.7 58.14 
Azerbaijan 500.11 79.54 56.31 47.94 40.12 
Georgia 1,409.0 147.19 108.91 86.01 75.84 
 
a. FREEDOM Support Act and Agency budgets; b. FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 funds. Does 
not include Defense or Energy Department funding, funding for exchanges, or Millennium Challenge Corporation 
programs in Armenia ($235.65 million) and Georgia ($295.3 million). 
 
In 2004, Armenia and Georgia were invited to apply for aid from the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA), a major development assistance program implemented by the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).523 The MCC provides aid to states “that meet 
certain standards of accountability and commitment to economic and democratic 
reform.”524 In September 2005, MCC approved a 295.3 million dollar “compact” with 
Georgia to improve “transport, energy, and other infrastructure and to stimulate 
enterprise development, especially in agriculture.”525 A major portion of the compact was 
allocated to rehabilitation of the gas pipeline network in Georgia, which Georgian 
authorities would otherwise have been compelled to sell to Russia’s Gazprom in order to 
save it from imminent collapse. The Georgian government undertook a commitment not 
to sell its gas pipeline network until the expiration of the compact term, “except as may 
be otherwise agreed by MCC in writing.”526 Stephan Mann, U.S. President’s Advisor for 
Caspian Energy Issues, noted that “selling of the gas pipeline system . . . contradict[s] the 
plans of the United States, which envisage creation of alternative gas supply sources for 
Georgia.”527 
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In December 2005, the MCC approved a five-year 235.6 million dollar compact 
with Armenia, intended to “reduce rural poverty through rehabilitation of rural roads and 
irrigation.”528 The compact came with its own conditions. In a letter to President 
Kocharian, MCC Chief executive John Danilovich urged the Armenian government to 
take steps to correct problems of “electoral fraud and media restrictions” reported during 
the constitutional referendum in November 2005.529 In January 2006, the MCC signaled 
the release of economic assistance to Armenia, saying that it “has received credible 
reassurances that the Kocharian administration is committed to democracy and good 
governance.”530 In his January 18 message to Kocharian, Danilovich said that he was 
“heartened” by the Armenian government’s “commitment to pursue existing cases of 
fraudulent voting activity and violence against journalists, as well as . . . receptivity to 
outside assistance for training in election preparation, administration and monitoring.”531 
At the same time, the MCC warned the Armenian government that it must maintain 
eligibility standards or risk suspension of the compact. 
It has been suggested that U.S. assistance programs are part of American 
influence in the CIS and globally. Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright 
underscored this point in her statement before the House Appropriations Committee in 
2000. She said, 
[T]he term “foreign aid” has become virtually obsolete. Because when we 
fight proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, disease, and crime—we aid 
America. The same is true when we work worldwide to open markets, 
foster democracy and strengthen the rule of law.532 
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As Nichol notes, America’s support for economic reforms and privatization 
“directly serve U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and 
services and sources of energy and minerals.”533 The United States is interested in 
encouraging the transformation of the Southern Caucasian former Soviet states into 
politically stable and economically viable democracies. It appears that outcomes of such 
a transition are “more likely to benefit the United States if it remains engaged as a partner 
in the process, promoting its national security and values.”534 As Nye writes in his 
seminal book, The Paradox of American Power, today, when “the foundations of power 
have been moving away from the emphasis on military force” it is “intangible power 
resources, such as an attractive culture, ideology, and institutions” that help the U.S. to 
obtain the outcomes it desires in world politics.535 Undoubtedly, U.S. assistance 
programs to regional countries are a major investment in “instruments of soft power”536 
and, at the same time, an important vehicle for the regional countries to overcome the 
hardships of post-communist transformation and fully integrate into global political and 
economic processes. 
According to Tarnoff, democratization programs, including technical assistance to 
political parties and independent media, as well as financial or material support for civil 
society groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), carry “the danger of 
charges of U.S. interference in a country’s internal affairs.”537 Indeed, Georgia’s Rose 
Revolution was interpreted very differently in Washington and Moscow. While the 
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“an organized coup against an elected leadership that had succeeded only thanks to the 
support of outside forces.”538 As Baev writes, the Rose Revolution in Tbilisi took 
“Moscow very much by surprise.”539  
In his examination of Georgia’s Rose Revolution, Fairbanks writes that the U.S. 
was in “the throes of its most consistent and serious attempt ever in any ex-Soviet 
republic to secure free and fair balloting.”540 The United States had provided technical 
aid to computerize Georgia’s voter rolls and had funded a large OSCE election observer 
mission in Georgia. Fairbanks notes that significant financial support for deployment of 
domestic monitors had come from the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute and the 
Open Society Institute, funded by George Soros. The Open Society Institute had also 
provided funds for activities of Georgia’s Kmara (Enough) movement.541 Fairbanks notes 
that besides direct U.S. influence, other factors, such as economic distress, state 
weakness, a divided ruling party, a looming succession crisis, provided conditions in 
which independent businesses, NGOs and media came together to “aid democratization 
when the moment was right.”542 As Tarnoff writes, U.S. democratization programs “may 
have planted seeds of change, especially in support for civil society and political party 
training,” but “it is not possible to say to what degree U.S. assistance is responsible for 
the positive developments.”543  
Analysts maintain that the United States will continue to invest funds to promote 
democratization in the region, “but where infractions occur this will probably not have a 
major impact on U.S. policy towards the region.”544 According to Blank, “political 
conditionality as a prerequisite of investment, trade, and aid is fast receding in visibility 
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throughout the area” where energy and security dominate the agenda.545 Most recently, 
such concerns have been aired with regards to parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan, 
which were held with numerous irregularities and serious violations.546 Leo Platvoet, the 
head of the election observer delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe (PACE) went so far as to accuse the Bush Administration of having “double 
standards on democracy.”547 Similar accusations have also been made by Azerbaijan’s 
opposition parties.548 In this regard, American analysts have called for “a comprehensive, 
balanced, and strategic approach” towards southern Caucasian countries that will allow 
the U.S. to disassociate itself from trends and forces that “could later act to undermine 
internal and regional security and development in these states.”549 
D. OIL AND PIPELINE POLITICS 
Almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR, Western oil companies 
rushed to the countries of Caspian basin and tried to reach agreements on the exploitation 
of the region’s oil and gas fields.550 It soon became clear to Western policymakers that 
the Transcaucasus occupies a strategic position as a gateway to the Caspian and a transit 
point of energy resources to the West. U.S. strategists were interested in “dual 
containment” of Iran—discouraging pipelines that would traverse its territory, and 
preventing Iranian companies from participating in the development of Azerbaijani oil 
and gas fields.551 Moreover, Caspian energy supplies moving westward and bypassing 
Russia were to provide “freedom from Russian influence”552 by lessening the 
dependence of South Caucasian and Central Asian small states on Russian export routes; 
in the case of energy importing countries, the new routes were to diversify their energy 
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supplies. This meant U.S. support for non-Russian BTC and BTE pipelines, which would 
simultaneously increase the influence of Turkey in the region by tying it to the 
Transcaucasian states.553 Washington made it clear that in addition to economic 
concerns, there were political factors behind its decision to support the construction of 
these pipelines. As one analyst writes, “throughout the project’s history, political support 
has been stronger than commercial backing.”554 
Initially, BTC was conceived as a Baku-Ceyhan direct pipeline, which in the 
shortest and economically cheapest way would transport Caspian oil to the Mediterranean 
Sea—passing through Armenia.555 However, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh put an 
end to this idea, since both Armenia and Azerbaijan rejected the proposal—the former 
refusing to make concessions for the sake of the oil transit deal, the latter not willing to 
make its energy exports dependent on Armenia.556 Therefore, the construction of BTC, 
BTE pipelines, and “the development of the East-West transport and telecommunications 
corridor all took place through Georgia—effectively deepening regional isolation of 
Armenia,”557 which was already blockaded by Azerbaijan and Turkey.  
The projects simultaneously increased both Georgia’s geopolitical importance and 
the special U.S. attention towards it.558 As Cornell notes, “a chain is no stronger than its 
weakest link,” and accordingly, in the crucial region of the South Caucasus, “the crucially 
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strategic region is Georgia.”559 Importantly, with the construction of BTC and BTE, 
Azerbaijan and Turkey hoped to achieve one of their key foreign policy goals—that is, 
Armenia’s economic isolation for the purpose of weakening it economically and gaining 
advantage in NK negotiations.560  
The next chapter examines Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani 
relations—aiming to identify their place in Armenia’s larger geopolitical environment. It 
also brings in the major findings from analysis of Russian and U.S. regional policies to 
explain Armenia’s foreign policy behavior.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline (From: Strategic Forecasting Inc. 
“Circumventing the Bear,” 16 December 2005. Online. Available from 
http://www.stratfor.com/ (accessed 15 January 2006) 
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V. THE GEOPOLITICS OF ARMENIA AND ITS POLICY OF 
MULTIDIRECTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY   
A. THE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES AND CHALLENGES TO 
ARMENIA’S SECURITY 
1. Geographical Imperatives 
Spatial patterns and geographical factors are closely tied to the foreign policy and 
strategy of a state.561 The geographical element is important in Buzan’s theory of 
regional security subsystems and in Walt’s balance of threat theory. The geographical 
environment crucially shapes the sense of “threat” for the regional states that are locked 
in geographical proximity with each other.562 According to Adalian, Armenia’s foreign 
policy is influenced by two “geographical imperatives”: the country’s small size (29,800 
sq km) and its location.563 Armenia is landlocked and lacks strategic depth. Before 
reaching the region’s waterways, Armenian goods and people have to pass through large 
stretches of foreign soil. This means that serious interference by neighboring countries in 
the communication and transportation lines can be a major destabilizing factor for 
Armenia.564 This vulnerability is compounded by the country’s limited resource base and 
absence of natural barriers on many of its borders. 
Armenia shares a border with two former Soviet states—Azerbaijan (787 km) and 
Georgia (164 km)—as well as with Turkey (268 km) and Iran (35 km).565 Armenia’s 
relations with Georgia and Iran are good, Turkey is unfriendly and Azerbaijan is hostile. 
Georgia is an important link between Armenia to the outside world, but Georgia’s ability 
to serve as a dependable transport route could be severely limited by domestic instability 
and the revival of ethnic conflicts in Georgia’s regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
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Turkey and Iran are sizeable countries with activist regional policies and conflicting 
interests and values.566 Turkey is a secular, pro-Western country and the West’s proxy 
security guarantor in the region, while Iran is an international pariah, standing for Islamic 
fundamentalism and “everything anti-Western.”567 Although the regional policies of 
Turkey and Iran “may not necessarily confront Armenia,” their contest for regional 
influence places Armenia in “harm’s way,” directly impinging upon Armenia’s security 
concerns.568  
The regional security picture is even more complicated in light of Russian and 
U.S. engagement in the region. These challenges and the complexity of the regional 
geopolitics make the security “a number one priority for Armenia.”569 Additionally, 
Armenia’s security consciousness and threat perceptions are influenced by historical 
mistrust of Turkey, its powerful neighbor to the West. This is mainly due to the genocide 
and forced deportation of two-thirds of the Armenian community in Ottoman Turkey in 
the beginning of twentieth century, and successive Turkish governments’ continued 
insistence on rejecting and rewriting the history of this matter.570 
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2. Armenian-Turkish Relations 
From the very start, Turkey adopted a policy of “coercion” towards independent 
Armenia.571 Although Turkey recognized Armenia’s independence as early as 1991, it 
refused to establish diplomatic relations with the country, introducing several obstacles 
for normalization of relations. The conditions demanded by Turkey included Armenia’s 
official recognition of the Treaty of Kars (drawn up by Ankara and Moscow in October 
1921); abandonment of efforts to obtain affirmation of the genocide; repudiation of any 
land claims by Armenia’s government (despite the fact that there were no such claims), 
and unilateral concessions to Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia is 
the legal successor of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), which was one of 
the signatories of the Treaty of Kars. The latter has not been revoked or denounced by the 
Republic of Armenia and remains in force today. The Treaty of Kars, together with the 
Treaty of Moscow (March 1921) signed away significant portions of historic Armenia 
and established Nakhichevan as an autonomous exclave of Azerbaijan, at the same time 
burying the Armenian question to cement Bolshevik Russia’s alliance with Kemalist 
Turkey. Ataturk opposed territorial arrangements favoring Armenia, because he believed 
“a strong Armenia could have potential territorial claims on Turkey.”572 
In 1991, President Levon Ter-Petrosian and the Armenian Pan-National 
Movement (APNM) party assumed power in the newly independent Armenia, bringing 
“new ideas about Armenia’s relations with the outside world.”573 Ter-Petrosian explained 
this new vision during his visit to the U.S. in August 1990: 
The most important factor for the future of the independent Armenian 
state is not having the protector in distant Moscow, but normalizing 
relations with its immediate neighbors, including Turkey. I believe that 
normal relations can benefit all concerned parties. By establishing  
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relations with neighboring Turkey, it can build up its trade and achieve 
access to sea routes through the Black Sea and to modern highways 
leading to Europe and the Middle East.574  
The leadership of the APNM maintained that modern-day Turkey was 
fundamentally different from the Ottoman Empire and has abandoned ideas of “pan-
Turkism” and “pan-Islamism.”575 The APNM saw the threat of “pan-Turkism” simply as 
a tool that the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), a leading nationalist, pro-
Russian opposition party, to keep Yerevan dependent on Moscow.576 Armenia’s 
leadership also argued that Turkey had adopted a European orientation, which should 
facilitate Armenian-Turkish rapprochement.577  
Armenia’s new government, therefore, adopted a generally conciliatory line 
towards Ankara and embarked on a series of initiatives aimed at building confidence in 
Turkish political circles.578 The issue of genocide was relegated to a secondary status.579 
This was a significant departure from traditional Armenian political thinking, which put 
the Turkish recognition of the genocide as a precondition for normalizing relations.580 
The desire to disassociate official Yerevan from that issue was so strong that the 
country’s Foreign Minister, the Diaspora Armenian Raffi Hovannisian, resigned, at Ter-
Petrosian’s request, following his unauthorized remarks on the genocide while in 
Turkey.581 According to Astourian, it was impossible to “forget the Genocide,” so the 
Ter-Petrosian government decided to leave the issue to historians, who could find a 
“happy medium” between Turkish and Armenian positions on the issue.582  
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The APNM had to balance nationalistic sentiment against the Turkish direction of 
Armenia’s foreign policy. The ARF was accused of colluding with the Russian secret 
services; one of its top leaders, Hrair Maroukhian, was forced to leave the country.583 
The APNM also signaled to diaspora Armenians that they “should not meddle in the 
political life of Armenia; rather, they should content themselves with providing financial 
aid”—that is, supporting the government’s policies.584  
Armenia’s government assumed that normalization of relations with Turkey 
would weaken Azerbaijan’s negotiating position and ensure Armenia’s “piece of the pie” 
in the development of energy corridors.585 At the same time, Yerevan began signaling its 
intention to officially recognize Turkey’s existing borders and renounce any territorial 
claims to Eastern Anatolia.586 The Turkish orientation of Armenian foreign policy, 
however, did not pass the test of the time, because the majority of assumptions 
underlying it were “highly dubious.”587  
It appeared that Turkey was not as interested in normalizing relations with 
Armenia as was Armenia with Turkey.588 Moreover, Ankara decided “to make its 
relations with Armenia derivative of its relations with Azerbaijan,”589 a country seen as a 
“strategic pillar” for projection of Turkish influence into the Transcaspian and Central 
Asia.590 The Turkish press and public had been strongly supportive of the Azerbaijani 
position since 1988, when the conflict first erupted. Initially, official Ankara tried to 
present itself as an impartial mediator.591 However, as the fighting continued in  
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Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh army began defeating the Azerbaijani forces, 
Ankara adopted an increasingly bellicose stand towards Armenia, thus pushing it into an 
alliance with Russia.592 
In early 1992, thousands of demonstrators took the streets in Turkey calling for 
“Holy War” against Armenia as an intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan.593 Jones writes 
that “criticism for standing idle while their ‘Azeri brethren’ were being massacred came 
from virtually all political directions.”594 In May 1992, Turkish President Turgut Özal 
openly threatened to send the Turkish army into the South Caucasus.595 Several dozen 
Turkish officers were “encouraged” to train the Azerbaijani army, and about fifty 
thousand troops massed on the Armenian border.596 At the same time, the Commander of 
Turkish Land Forces announced that “all the necessary preparations have been made and 
that the army was awaiting orders from Ankara to act.”597  
Bound by the Tashkent Treaty, Moscow was quick to react, with Marshal Evgenii 
Shaposhnikov, then Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS, warning 
that any Turkish military interference into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could escalate 
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the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would result in an arms embargo against Turkey and 
suspension of U.S. military aid by the Congress at the prompting of Armenian-American 
lobby.599  
Faced with a “mounting crisis,” Ankara stepped back, disregarding domestic 
pressure and appeals from Baku for Turkish military involvement in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict.600 However, the Turkish elite did not become more flexible and 
Ankara’s policies towards Armenia did not change. According to Astourian, President 
Özal, shortly before his death in 1993, evidently alluding to the genocide, stated that 
“Armenia has not learned its lesson from the experience in Anatolia and the punishment 
inflicted.”601  
The victory of Azerbaijan came to be viewed in Ankara as “the sine qua non of a 
successful regional policy.”602  In 1993, as the Nagorno-Karabakh forces advanced, 
Turkey barred the delivery of humanitarian aid to Armenia through its territory and 
closed Armenia’s access to transit routes, joining Azerbaijan’s blockade of the 
country.603 This further undermined the Turkish direction of APNM’s foreign policy. 
Yerevan’s numerous appeals to Ankara for bilateral ties independent of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict remained futile.604 The blockade also added a new item to Turkey’s 
Armenian agenda: “the conditions of opening the border.”605 Turkish officials have 
maintained that the border will be opened only after the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict on terms acceptable to Azerbaijan.606 
Armenia’s shortest trade route to the outside world passes through the Turkish 
corridor to the Mediterranean. By a process of elimination, the blockade aligned Armenia 
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on a north-south axis, significantly increasing transportation costs and therefore lessening 
the country’s investment attractiveness.607 In 2004, Azerbaijan’s leader, Ilham Aliev, has 
publicly acknowledged that continued closure of the Armenia-Turkish border is a “huge 
bargaining chip in Azerbaijan’s hand,” and its opening would weaken Baku’s negotiating 
position.608 Analysts have suggested that over time, Ankara has become hostage to the 
policies of Baku, which manipulates Turkey’s dependence on oil and gas resources.609 
The development of energy corridors that bypass Armenia (the BTC and BTE 
pipelines) presented another opportunity for Ankara and Baku to increase Armenia’s 
isolation and weaken it economically to achieve a strategic upper hand in their 
negotiations with Yerevan. More recently, Turkey announced plans to promote 
construction of a railroad linking it to Azerbaijan via Georgia, bypassing Armenia. 
Importantly, this multi-million project is designed as an alternative to the existing Kars-
Gyumri-Tbilisi-Baku railway that passes through Armenia. Yerevan has announced that 
it is “ready to let that railway function without its participation,” but Ankara has refused 
to heed the appeal.610 Yerevan views this project as yet another attempt to increase 
Armenia’s isolation and force it to unilateral concessions. 
Turkey has also stepped up its military cooperation with Azerbaijan. Since 1996, 
Ankara has been actively involved in the training of Azerbaijan’s officers. According to 
Cornell, Turkey “has basically built the Azerbaijani military.”611 Turkey also provides 
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substantial military aid to Azerbaijan. From the Armenian perspective, Turkey’s military 
assistance to Azerbaijan is intended to distort the existing military balance between 
Baku and Yerevan. Additionally, in all international forums Turkey promotes the 
“Azerbaijani interpretation of the conflict.”612 Importantly, Turkey’s support of 
Azerbaijan reinforces the unyielding and revisionist attitude of the Azerbaijani leadership 
towards Karabakh—a situation replete with risks of an escalation that neither 
Azerbaijanis nor Armenians can afford. 
3. Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 
Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are perhaps the most challenging in 
the South Caucasus region. The Nagorno-Karabakh problem is the crux of this complex 
relationship and the cornerstone of “Armenia’s foreign policy complications.”613 The 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has a profound historical and political legacy. It deals with 
the competing principles of self-determination versus territorial integrity and is often seen 
as the most complex and unresolved issue in the South Caucasus. A brief analysis of the 
problem is important to understand the security challenges that lie ahead and the 
prospects of conflict’s resolution. 
It is important to note that except during the Soviet period, Nagorno-Karabakh 
has never been part of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction over the Nagorno-Karabakh 
was an exclusively Soviet creation; it was established in 1921 by the Bolsheviks’ 
Caucasian committee, the Kavburo, under the chairmanship of Joseph Stalin (then 
Commissar on Nationalities) against the will of the overwhelming majority of the NK 
population.614 Two years later, the Soviet authorities drew the borders of the NKAO—a 
region with a majority Armenian population (about 94 percent), but no link to 
Armenia.615 Before this turn of history, in 1920, the League of Nations had refused de 
jure recognition of the Republic of Azerbaijan of 1918-1920. The Nagorno-Karabakh 
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was recognized as a disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan.616 Importantly, 
with its declaration of independence, Azerbaijan formally established itself as the 
successor state of the Republic of Azerbaijan of 1918-1920, thus nullifying the legal basis 
that determined Azerbaijan’s authority over Nagorno-Karabakh during the Soviet 
period.617 
The arbitrary decision of Soviet rulers was never accepted by Armenians, who felt 
that Nagorno-Karabakh’s economic, social and cultural development were being 
“deliberately sabotaged by Azerbaijani authorities.”618 During the Soviet era, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh population periodically protested their plight (in 1945, 1966, and 
1977).619 In February 1988, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh officially petitioned the 
Soviet government to allow their Oblast to decide its own status. Their pleas and peaceful 
demonstrations were followed by massacres, sanctioned by Azerbaijani authorities, of 
Armenians in Sumgait and Baku.620 As de Waal writes, the atrocities changed the nature 
of the Karabakh conflict “from confrontational politics into outright conflict.”621 In 
Armenia, “comparison was immediately felt and expressed with massacres of 1915, the 
Genocide.”622  
In December 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum in accordance with the 
USSR law “On the Procedures of Resolution of Problems on the Secession of a Union 
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Republic from USSR” and obtained an overwhelming mandate for independence, 
declaring itself the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.623  Misunderstanding the “depth of 
the resistance” and the Karabakh Armenians’ commitment to self-determination, the 
Azerbaijani government decided to solve the conflict in the battlefield.624 An all-out war 
followed, resulting in a considerable number of casualties and refugees on both sides.625 
Armenia assumed the obligation to protect the Armenian population of Karabakh, whose 
very survival was threatened by Azerbaijan.626 Azerbaijan’s offensive strategy failed, and 
by 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh forces “took control of certain surrounding territories,” 
creating a buffer zone to safeguard the population from further Azerbaijani military 
aggression.627 As Oskanian notes, the purpose was “security and self-determination, not 
acquisition of territory.”628 
Several unsuccessful attempts of mediation were made throughout the war. In 
1994, Russia facilitated the signing of an armistice between Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Karabakh.629 The ceasefire has held despite the absence of peacekeeping forces in the 
conflict zone. Over time, the OSCE Minsk Group has emerged as the international 
mediation efforts’ primary mechanism to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A 
number of proposals have been presented by the Group’s Russian, U.S. and French co-
chairs as a framework for negotiations. It has been reported that the most recent phase of 
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negotiations centers on a “hybrid peace plan” in which the most of the security zone 
around Nagorno-Karabakh would be returned prior to a referendum in Karabakh on its 
status.630  
During 2005, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group reported some progress in settling 
the conflict. The mediators foresaw “highly favorable” conditions for resolving the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2006, emphasizing that because it is not an electoral year 
for either Armenia or Azerbaijan, it will be easier for each country’s leaders to reach 
unpopular compromise agreements. According to the mediators, failure to use this 
“golden opportunity” would mean several more years of deadlock.631 In February 2006, 
the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents met for the scheduled “crucial talks” at 
Rambouillet Chateau, France, but the two sides did not register any progress.632  
It has been suggested that the Azerbaijani leader has rejected the idea of allowing 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region to decide its status in a referendum.633 Following the 
Rambouillet talks, in an interview with Turkish NTV television, Aliev stated that 
Azerbaijan would “never agree to Karabakh’s secession from Azerbaijan” and that he 
expects to reach better results “after waiting for a while.”634 Armenia’s Foreign Minister 
articulated Yerevan’s position that in the Rambouillet peace talks they agreed to the 
“utmost line beyond which Armenia really cannot go.”635 The Armenian side proclaimed  
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the following to be the main premises of a peace policy: a horizontal relationship between 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, a secure geographic link with Armenia, and security 
guarantees for the people of Karabakh.636 
In 2005, Aliev announced plans to use proceeds from Azerbaijan’s increasing oil 
exports to double their military expenditures for 2006 and to continue increases to match 
Armenia’s total budget.637 In March 2006, following the Rambouillet peace talks, he 
stated that Azerbaijan “must get ready and the population must be mobilized.”638 The 
pro-war rhetoric is growing among politicians and media in Azerbaijan. The 
announcements of intent to wipe out Armenia are often made at the top levels of 
Azerbaijani political circles.639 Recently, one of the Azerbaijani major political parties, 
the National-Democratic party, bestowed the “Man of the Year” award for protecting 
state and national interests on Ramil Safarov.  Safarov is an Azerbaijani officer who in 
2004, during a NATO Partnership for Peace program in Hungary, murdered an Armenian 
officer, Gurgen Margarian, in his sleep, with an axe.640 Analysts note that hate narratives, 
ethnic intolerance and war-mongering statements only exacerbate Armenians’ threat 
perceptions, undermine confidence and reduce the “capacity for compromise.”641  
Waltz has suggested that states will strive to compensate for external 
disequilibrium and will be induced to play the balance of power game, mobilizing 
available external and internal means (intensifying their economic and military buildup). 
Indeed, there are signs of intensification of the arms race between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. In response to Azerbaijan’s increasing military expenditures, Armenia has 
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boosted its military spending for 2006 by about 20 percent.642 Although the increase was 
not as pronounced as that of Azerbaijan’s, the Armenian leadership has maintained that it 
is enough to assure the balance between forces.643 They suggest that Azerbaijan’s 
increased military budget will not translate to a military superiority anytime soon. 
Armenia’s Minister of Defense, Serzh Sarkisyan, announced that in 2005 Armenia 
managed a considerable replenishment of its armaments and purchased almost as much 
ammunition as it had acquired in the previous ten years.644 Importantly, the CSTO 
framework serves as a major source for Armenia’s acquisition of Russian weaponry at 
discounted prices. 
Observers note that although long-term economic and demographic trends favor 
Azerbaijan, those advantages “may not be a deciding factor.”645 Fifteen years have 
passed since Nagorno-Karabakh’s declaration of independence and Nagorno-Karabakh 
has materialized as a viable state. The reality is that this unrecognized republic has built 
all the attributes of statehood (a new parliament, several registered political parties, and 
state ministries) and has proven its ability to govern and protect its people, hold 
democratic elections, and conduct foreign relations.646 Over time, the Nagorno-Karabakh 
army has constructed formidable front line defenses and has managed heavy 
militarization along the border. Observers maintain that control over the buffer zone 
gives substantial strength to Nagorno-Karabakh forces.647 They note that the Nagorno-
Karabakh population has “concluded on the basis of their troubled history that they 
cannot safely reside in territory controlled by Azerbaijan . . . [and therefore] they are 
prepared to sustain high levels of suffering.”648 As Oskanian writes, 
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[T]he Azerbaijani authorities want to believe that if they do not realize 
their maximum demands through negotiations, they can always resort to 
military solutions. But is it not obvious that a conclusive military 
resolution is not possible? A successful military solution would require 
more than conventional arms against the people of Nagorny Karabakh, 
who are defending their own homes. Azerbaijan can succeed in its 
attempts only by ethnically cleansing Nagorny Karabakh of all 
Armenians.649 
Analysts maintain that “Azerbaijan’s relative economic strength is also its 
vulnerability . . . [because a new war will] interfere with petroleum transport, undermine 
regional investment and compromise Azerbaijan’s economic momentum.”650 The 
resumption of military activities will result in greater human suffering and material 
destruction, as it is unlikely that the new war “will remain as limited as the previous 
one.”651 Not only will it be fought with more sophisticated and deadly weaponry, but, 
according to de Waal, in “a nightmarish scenario,” Russia and Turkey would be drawn 
into a major regional confrontation through their alignments.652 It is clear that such 
scenarios are not in the best interest of any party. 
The two major regional players involved in the peace talks, Russia and the United 
States, support a peaceful resolution of the conflict, since the alternative scenario would 
most likely jeopardize their regional interests.653 Both countries have repeatedly stated 
that they will support any peace plan acceptable to both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. At 
the same time, they emphasize that neither side should expect to achieve 100 percent of 
what it wants.654 Clearly, peaceful resolution of the conflict will require significant 
concessions from both parties, but, as de Waal notes, the peace deal has to respect the 
“force of will . . . that led to secession.”655 From the Armenian perspective, the basis of 
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the peace deal “is the affirmation of the right of the people of Nagorny Karabakh to self-
determination and international recognition of that right.”656 The remainder of this 
chapter considers how Armenia’s contentious relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey have 
complicated its relations with Russia and the United States and shaped its foreign policy. 
B. ARMENIA’S FOREIGN POLICY OF COMPLEMENTARITY AND ITS 
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
From the very start, Armenia’s leadership sought to avoid entangling the country 
in alliances and strived to make Armenia self-reliant in regards to its security needs. The 
leadership maintained that Armenia had for too long relied for solutions to its security 
problems on an outside power, be it Russia or the West.657 Armenian leaders wanted to 
maintain “security, political and economic balance in [their] relationship with the world 
powers.”658 Their priority was to develop active bilateral ties “with as many countries as 
feasible” and to participate in different international organizations to facilitate Armenia’s 
integration into international system.659  
Due to the interdependent links of the Soviet economy and Armenia’s dependence 
on Russian energy resources, Armenia had to keep its ties with Russia, but that 
relationship also had to be complemented by Armenia’s close relations with the United 
States and the European countries. The principle of multidirectional complementarity, 
based on open, equal dialogue and cooperation with all parties, has become the 
cornerstone of modern-day Armenia’s foreign policy. The policy is intended to reduce 
polarization in the region and is seen as the best guarantee of Armenia’s national security. 
The policy of complementarity prioritizes normalization of relations with all of 
Armenia’s neighbors, including Turkey. 
After fifteen years of independence, Armenia has succeeded in normalizing 
relations with all its neighbors and non-neighboring regional players except for Turkey 
and Azerbaijan. Armenia has pursued close military and security ties with Russia and has 
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recently deepened bilateral cooperation in the energy field. Throughout much of the 
1990s, the policy of complementarity was mostly asymmetric, involving “military and 
security ties with Russia on the one hand, economic assistance programs and democracy-
building with the U.S. on the other.”660  
As the U.S. involvement in the region increased and Washington boosted its 
security cooperation with regional countries, Armenia sought to balance its security 
dependence on Moscow with its expanding relations with Washington. Armenia entered 
into layers of security arrangements. Armenian-Russian bilateral military and security 
cooperation and Armenia’s membership within the CSTO have been complemented by 
bilateral security ties to the United States and extensive relations with NATO.  Yerevan 
has also pursued closer relations with Tehran in the areas of energy, trade and 
transportation.   
Both neorealist and neoliberal theories—discussed in chapter II—are helpful in 
explaining Armenia’s foreign policy behavior. The analysis of security 
interdependencies, based on Buzan’s framework of regional security subsystems, 
demonstrates that within the South Caucasian security complex, Armenia’s close ties to 
Russia can be explained mainly by Armenia’s desire to balance against perceived threats 
from Turkey. Ankara’s support of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, its 
desire to coerce, isolate and weaken Armenia and its continuous denial of the Armenian 
Genocide all contribute to Armenia’s perception of Turkey as its chief security threat. 
According to Armenia’s Foreign Minister Oskanian, Turkey’s “continuing insistence on 
preconditions to normal relations creates a breach in confidence . . . [t]he absence of 
normal relations creates a fear of unexpected actions and complicates an already tense 
security environment.”661  
The perceived security threat emanating from Turkey is the product of Walt’s four 
sources of threats. Walt has suggested that small states are more likely to balance against 
the most threatening power if balancing alliances are available and viable. The Turko-
centrism of U.S. policy, along with Washington’s geopolitical and geo-strategic interests 
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in Azerbaijan, have made Armenia’s leadership hesitant to rely solely on the U.S. to 
safeguard Armenia’s security. Despite its obvious interest in normalizing Armenian-
Turkish relations, the United States, according to Oskanian, has shown an “inability to 
bend its junior partner’s, Turkey’s policies towards greater cooperation with 
Armenia.”662 As Oskanian notes, this is primarily because 
Turkey’s role in Iraq, with Israel, between NATO and EU defense policy, 
not to say anything of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, are all too critical to risk 
jeopardizing by pushing a positive Turkish-Armenian agenda in the face 
of Turkish resistance.663 
In contrast, Russia, for its own security reasons, is both interested and willing to 
check Turkey’s influence in the South Caucasus. Russia is also Armenia’s traditional ally 
in the region. The convergence of Armenian and Russian threat perceptions led them to 
cement an alliance to balance against expanding Turkish influence. What Walt describes 
as secondary determinants of alignment, such as shared cultural and religious factors, 
further enhanced the effectiveness of the Armenian-Russian alliance against Turkey. 
A balancing alliance could create divisive lines in the region, whereby Armenian-
Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations would be tied to the broader Russian-
American regional competition—with potentially disastrous consequences for Armenia. 
This scenario, however, has never materialized for two main reasons: Armenia’s pursuit 
of   complementarity and its efforts to conflate U.S.-Russian interests; and evolving U.S.-
Russian security cooperation.       
Armenia recognizes the importance of close ties with the United States to 
complement Armenian-Russian security cooperation and strengthen Armenia’s economic 
and political institutions. The U.S.-Armenian cooperation in these areas significantly 
improves Armenia’s security and its economic and political situation, correspondingly   
diminishing its dependence on Moscow. Moreover, close cooperation with the United 
States brings Armenia closer to its goal of European integration. Armenia has also been 
enthused about cooperating with the U.S. in areas of interest to Washington, such as anti-
terrorism, peacekeeping, NATO activities, and domestic political and economic reforms.  
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Through such cooperation Armenia has managed to build a “proportionate and 
diversified relationship” with the United States and Russia, erasing former asymmetries 
in its relations with both powers.664 In turn, this has helped to prevent polarization in the 
region. In this sense, Armenia’s increasing bilateral relations with the U.S. have   
weakened the opposing Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance. Therefore, to some extent, this 
policy can be seen as an external balancing strategy along the lines of Waltz’s balance of 
power theory. 
The U.S.-Russian cooperation also helps to prevent creation of regional dividing 
lines. Analysts maintain that the “Great Game” metaphor has become an anachronism.665 
There is significant cooperation and compatibility between U.S. and Russian interests in 
the region. For instance, the U.S. presence in Georgia and Central Asia arguably serves 
Russia’s own short-term interests in countering terrorism. There is also considerable 
regional competition between the two powers. Importantly, the nature and the quality of 
that competition are visibly different from the Cold War rivalry. Issue-linkages and 
multiple interactions have produced a very sophisticated pattern of cooperation and 
competition between Washington and Moscow, and in many areas the framework of 
U.S.-Russian bilateral relations has developed into a non zero-sum game. It seems, 
though, that sustainable progress in U.S.-Russian cooperation will depend greatly on 
Russia’s progress towards democracy. Undoubtedly, coordination of U.S.-Russian 
policies can lead to regional stability and conflict resolution—a Great Gain scenario not 
only for Armenia, but for the region as well. 
Keohane and Nye argue that asymmetrical dependence is the major source of 
power in an interdependent world. Moscow has a history of exploiting asymmetrical 
interdependencies to exert political influence over the CIS countries. Armenia seems both 
sensitive and vulnerable to Russia’s energy imports. Continuous expansion of Russian 
corporate energy interests into key energy sectors of Armenia has made the latter more 
dependent on Moscow. Such dependent relations provide Russia with potential leverage 
over Armenia’s internal political and foreign policy developments. 
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Armenia has sought to decrease the vulnerability dimension of this 
interdependence and has deepened its energy relations with Iran to complement Russian-
Armenian energy cooperation. The Iranian-Armenian pipeline, projected to bring Iranian 
gas to Armenia in 2007, is an important part of this strategy and will serve to 
significantly bolster Armenia’s energy security.  
C. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
The dynamics of American-Russian relations and global geopolitical trends will 
continue to impact Armenia’s course of complementarity in foreign policy. As Russia 
reasserts itself in the face of a broadening U.S. involvement in the Southern Caucasus, 
the region may well emerge as an arena of great power competition and confrontation 
between Moscow and Washington. Armenia then may find itself in the unpleasant 
position of having to choose sides. Armenia’s subsequent decision would likely depend 
on each side’s ability to fulfill the state’s vital security interests—protection of Armenia’s  
sovereignty and security, peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and 
creation of a favorable security environment in the region. 
From the Armenian perspective, Turkey’s credibility as a positive regional player 
has diminished significantly because of Ankara’s regional policies. Confidence-building 
measures between the two countries, such as establishing unconditional diplomatic 
relations, opening the border and improving trade relations, would ease Armenians’ 
feelings of insecurity. A more balanced engagement by Turkey in the South Caucasus 
might help produce a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
These changes would open up avenues for cooperation between Armenia and 
Turkey and among the three South-Caucasian countries, helping to change their common 
understanding of the region’s future. The EU might serve as an ideal interlocutor, as it is 
already involved in monitoring Turkey’s compliance with EU norms. Given EU 
standards and ideals, it is logical to expect that as a condition of membership in the EU, 
Turkey will be expected to revisit and normalize its relations with Armenia. Until such a 
time, Armenia is likely to continue its policy of multidirectional complementarity. 
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